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An emergency operations center (EOC) plays a critical role during a community’s 
response to a disaster. Yet, little research exists that assesses the impact of the 
organization’s structure on an EOC staff’s performance. This thesis explores how 
configuration theory, which emphasizes the need for an organization’s structure to fit the 
situation, can help emergency managers organize an EOC’s staff to improve its 
performance. Specifically, it uses configuration theory to examine the Snohomish  
County (WA) EOC’s response to the State Route 530 flooding and mudslides incident. 
From that case study, three workgroups were selected, and members of each 
workgroup were interviewed. The results were analyzed twice, first by distinct 
workgroup and then cumulatively. Among the findings is the diversity of influences on 
the task environments of different workgroups responding to the same incident; the 
findings also reveal that the groups implemented aspects of more than one structure. 
Based on these analyses, recommendations are made to update EOC doctrine and training 
to focus on situational factors and flexible configurations, including hybrid 
configurations. And while the setting for this research is a local EOC, its outcomes 
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 A community’s emergency operations center (EOC) plays a critical role during 
the response to large-scale incidents.1 But despite its importance, current EOC doctrine 
addressing how to organize the staff of an EOC seems incomplete, as do training 
opportunities for EOC staff.2 Current emergency management doctrine and training focus 
on the incident command system (ICS), which is intended to manage field-level 
operations.3 EOCs present a different environment than that for which the ICS structure 
was designed, and it is incumbent on individual jurisdictions to structure their EOCs in 
manners they think will maximize their members’ efficiency and effectiveness. 
  Configuration theory, an extension of structural contingency theory, offers 
concepts and principles that might improve an EOC staff’s performance. Configuration 
theory holds that systematic relationships exist between an organization’s task 
environment and the configuration of its organizational features, and that a closer fit 
between the task environment and structural features results in a greater likelihood of 
successful organizational performance. 
 This thesis examines different parts of an EOC’s response to a large-scale incident 
using the lens of configuration theory. It relies heavily on the work of Henry Mintzberg, 
one of the early configuration theorists, who argued that, “The elements of structure 
should be selected to achieve an internal consistency or harmony, as well as a basic 
consistency with the organization’s situation.”4 Mintzberg hypothesized that most 
organizations naturally fall into five basic configurations; he also recognized that some 
                                                 
1 Ronald W. Perry, “Emergency Operations Centres in an Era of Terrorism: Policy and Management 
Functions,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 11, no. 4 (December 2003): 151. 
2 G. Kemble Bennet, Recommendations on the Emergency Operations Center’s Role in NIMS 
(Memorandum; Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] National Advisory 
Council [NAC], August 11, 2009). 
3 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2008), 46.  
4 Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations (Edgewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1983), 3. 
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organizations are characterized by properties shared by two or more of the basic 
configurations. Mintzberg considered these to be hybrid organizations. 
 This research used a single-case study design with embedded units of analysis. 
The author conducted interviews with three representatives from three workgroups (nine 
total interviews) that were part of the response by the Snohomish County (WA) EOC 
(SCEOC) to the State Route (SR) 530 flooding and mudslides incident. That incident, the 
deadliest mudslide in U.S. history, involved hundreds of responders and affected 
numerous communities. The three workgroups—the Snohomish County EOC’s Logistics 
Section, the SR 530 Task Force, and the Human Services Multiagency Task Force—were 
selected because they performed distinct tasks, on different timelines, and in different 
task environments. The author, a participant–observer who was indirectly involved with 
the workgroups, was also aware that they organized differently. 
 This research found that the groups experienced different factors that affected 
their respective task environments and that they adopted structures characterized by 
different structural properties. The SCEOC Logistics Section, which supported the 
resource needs of the incident, preexisted the case study. As disaster logistics doctrine 
and training indicate, it used a standardized work process in previous exercises and 
incidents; during this response, it found that process overwhelmed. Because the section’s 
leaders needed to act very quickly, they took a more prominent role; the group’s 
members, in order to address the complexity of the resource requests, coordinated 
directly with each other.  
 The SR 530 Task Force formed after the incident; its task was planning how to 
clear the debris from SR 530 so the road could be reopened. There was no previous 
knowledge of this type of planning, and the task force was working under significant time 
constraints. The expertise of the members helped them identify solutions to the problems 
posed by this novel situation, and their facilitator became instrumental in coordinating the 
timely efforts of the disparate disciplines. The third group was the Human Services 
Multiagency Task Force. Like the SR 530 Task Force, it formed after the incident with 
the task of supporting the survivors of the tragedy. This group’s size approached 200, and 
the creation of the task force was meant to coordinate the efforts to provide services to 
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meet a broad spectrum of need as quickly as possible in an evolving environment. The 
representatives of the agencies were experts in their respective areas of service and 
committed to helping people; however, the lack of a singular authority to direct them led 
to duplicated efforts.  
 All of the groups felt disparate pulls that meant they adopted facets of multiple 
configurations (i.e., they “hybridized” their configuration), especially as they moved from 
decision-making to problem solving. Each also interacted with a large number of external 
factors and stakeholders, experienced a lack of consistent staffing, and felt the pressure 
created by time criticality. In some cases, an understanding of configuration theory might 
have led to the earlier implementation of different structural properties that could have 
improved the organization’s performance. Although unable to travel back in time and 
definitively verify such assertions, this study demonstrates the benefits of understanding 
the relationship between the task environment and the configuration. It provides 
examples of how specific structural properties enhanced or hindered the analyzed groups’ 
performance, and thus it recommends that EOC doctrine and training, and emergency 
management education in general, expand to include configuration theory. 
There is a dearth of qualitative or quantitative research on the performance of 
EOCs. This research, an examination of an extreme case,5 offers unique insights and 
introduces the opportunities for many future studies. The staff in an EOC must perform 
well. Configuration theory offers a way that might ensure that. 
 
                                                 
5 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th ed., Applied Social Research 
Methods Series, Vol. 5 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009), 47. 
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Architecture does not create extraordinary organizations by collecting 
extraordinary people. It does so by enabling very ordinary people to 
perform in extraordinary ways. 
— John Kay, Foundations of Corporate Success:  
How Business Strategies Add Value 
  
When a disaster occurs, a community’s emergency operations center (EOC) plays 
an integral part in the response.1 The EOC’s role becomes particularly critical during the 
response to large-scale, low-probability incidents.2 Because of this, to paraphrase the 
quote above, enabling the ordinary people who staff EOCs to perform extraordinarily is a 
goal for emergency management professionals across the country. This research explores 
a way to achieve that goal. 
 This thesis examines different parts of an EOC’s response to a large-scale incident 
through the lens of configuration theory. Configuration theory describes how order can 
emerge from the interactions between different parts of an organization.3 It is an 
extension of contingency theory, a branch of organizational theory that holds that the 
most effective organizational structure is one based on the situation.4 Using these theories 
allows managers to implement organizational features that fit their groups’ situations. 
Thus, this thesis hypothesizes that EOC managers who implement the tenets of these 
theories will see their staff members perform more effectively and efficiently. 
 For this thesis, a case study is used to illustrate the relationship between 
organizational structures, the environments in which they operate, and their performance. 
                                                 
1 E. L. Quarantelli, Ten Criteria for Evaluating the Management of Community Disasters (Preliminary 
Paper #241; Newark, DE: University of Delaware Disaster Research Center, 1996), 16. 
2 Ronald W. Perry, “Emergency Operations Centres in an Era of Terrorism: Policy and Management 
Functions,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 11, no. 4 (December 2003): 151. 
3 Alan D. Meyer, Anne. S. Tsui, and C. R. Hinings, “Configurational Approaches to Organizational 
Analysis,” Academy of Management Journal 36, no. 6 (1993): 1178. 
4 Lex Donaldson, “The Contingency Theory of Organizational Design: Challenges and Opportunities,” 
in Organization Design: The Evolving State-of-the-Art, ed. Richard M. Burton et al. (New York: Springer 
Science + Business Media, 2006), 19. 
 2 
The case study reviews an incident that occurred in northwest Washington and was the 
deadliest mudslide in U.S. history. On March 22, 2014, the Snohomish County EOC 
(SCEOC) activated following an enormous mudslide that swept through a subdivision, 
destroying numerous homes and killing 43 people. The SCEOC’s staff coordinated the 
support to the response, and over the course of the next 40 days, a number of teams were 
formed to address a variety of issues that arose in the aftermath of this disaster. 
 This research examines three distinct workgroups that formed to address specific 
tasks during the response. One of these groups was the SCEOC Logistics Section, which 
was responsible for procuring resources to support the initial search and rescue and the 
subsequent search and recovery. The second group was the team that planned the debris 
clearing, which became known as “The SR 530 Task Force.” Its task was identifying a 
way to quickly remove the debris from State Route (SR) 530, debris that needed to be 
deliberately searched for remains and personal belongings. The final group was the 
Multiagency Task Force, which was the team tasked with meeting the human service 
needs of the survivors. 
 The author reviewed configuration theory literature, focusing on Henry 
Mintzberg’s work. He then conducted interviews with three representatives from each 
workgroup and analyzed their insights. The analysis revealed factors that shaped each 
group’s task environment and the nuances of the organizational structures each 
implemented. Analysis of the interview data identified variations in each group’s 
configuration; it also identified themes that they all shared. Cumulatively, these findings 
may help EOC managers structure their staff to optimize their performance. They may 





A. THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER AS A PROBLEM SPACE 
 Despite the significant role of the EOC, current EOC doctrine that discusses how 
to organize the staff of an EOC is incomplete, and training opportunities for EOC staff 
appear insufficient.5 Current emergency management doctrine, codified in the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) document, focuses on the incident command 
system (ICS), which is “used to organize on-scene operations.”6 The NIMS articulates 14 
management characteristics that contribute to the “strength and efficiency” of the ICS.7 
Some of these may be applicable to an EOC, but the intended use of the ICS is at the field 
level. This is a distinct environment. 
 EOCs coordinate incident response on a macro level, often using a team 
composed of representatives from the government, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and private or nonprofit organizations (PNPs) to coordinate the efforts of 
incident command posts (ICPs), the media, and other EOCs.8 This presents the potential 
for a very different environment than that for which the ICS structure was designed. The 
lack of specific direction on how to best organize an EOC’s staff makes it incumbent on 
individual jurisdictions to structure their EOCs in a manner they think will maximize 
their members’ efficiency and effectiveness. 
 Doing so implies that EOC managers understand organizational design and the 
benefits of different configurations, knowledge that may not be readily available. Many 
emergency managers rely on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
Emergency Management Institute (EMI) for training. Organizational design is not found 
in the EMI curriculum; nor, to a large degree, are courses focused specifically on EOCs. 
A scan of the list of EMI’s online independent study courses shows EMI’s training 
                                                 
5 G. Kemble Bennet, Recommendations on the Emergency Operations Center’s Role in NIMS 
(Memorandum; Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] National Advisory 
Council [NAC], August 11, 2009). 
6 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2008), 46. The NIMS dedicates 72 pages to ICS; it covers EOCs in two pages. 
7 Ibid., 46–49. 
8 Laura G. Militello et al., “Information Flow during Crisis Management: Challenges to Coordination 
in the Emergency Operations Center,” Cognition, Technology, and Work 9 (2007): 25. 
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program reflects the doctrinal emphasis on ICS.9 Thus, there are limited training 
opportunities available for an EOC staff trying to implement proper configurations to 
improve its efficiency and effectiveness for given situations and tasks. 
 There is also little empirical evidence upon which to rely. Despite its ubiquitous 
use by emergency responders, there are relatively few studies of the efficacy of the 
ICS,10 and there are virtually no studies that focus on EOC operations. In the one study 
that could be located, Lutz and Lindell examined the utilization of the ICS within an EOC 
and concluded, “ICS implementation in Texas EOCs during Hurricane Rita left much to 
be desired.”11 No other research was found that specifically attempted to examine an 
EOC staff’s performance or to identify specific organizational design elements that 
proved particularly useful in an EOC. This thesis endeavors to begin to fill that gap. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The principal question this thesis explores is how configuration theory can help 
emergency managers organize the staff of an EOC to improve its performance. 
Configuration theory specifies how relationships among contextual factors, such as the 
task environment and structural properties of an organization, relate to the performance. 
To answer the research question, the author analyzed three groups that performed distinct 
tasks during the response to the same large-scale incident and examined how their 
respective task environments and the structural properties they implemented influenced 
their performance. 
                                                 
9 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), “Independent Study Courses,” last modified 
December 4, 2014, http://training.fema.gov/is/crslist.aspx?all=true. FEMA lists 10 courses on ICS and one 
on EOC. 
10 Gregory A. Bigley and Karlene H. Roberts, “The Incident Command System: High-Reliability 
Organizing for Complex and Volatile Task Environments,” Academy of Management Journal 44, no. 6 
(December 2001): 1281–99; Dick A. Buck, Joseph E. Trainor, and Benigno E. Aguirre, “A Critical 
Evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management 3, no. 3 (2006); Donald P. Moynihan, From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina: Case Studies 
of Incident Command Systems (Networks and Partnerships Series; Washington, DC: IBM Center for the 
Business of Government, 2007). 
11 Leslie D. Lutz and Michael K. Lindell, “Incident Command System as a Response Model within 
Emergency Operations Centers during Hurricane Rita,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 
16, no. 3 (September 2008): 132. 
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C. RESEARCH METHOD AND LIMITATIONS 
 A single-case study design with embedded units of analysis formed the 
framework for this thesis. The author, a participant–observer, conducted semi-structured 
interviews with three representatives from each of the selected workgroups (nine total 
interviews). The interview subjects had extensive familiarity with their respective team’s 
structure and workings, and their responses were the primary source of data for this work. 
Documented reports and the author’s insights were other sources of data. 
 There were constraints to this research. Yin listed “traditional prejudices” against 
the case study method, including its perceived lack of rigor and potential lack of 
generalization.12 In addition, administrative regulations deriving from the Paperwork 
Reduction Act limited the number of interview subjects to nine. To offset this limitation 
on the number of subjects, those selected qualified under parameters established to try to 
ensure the highest quality of data. The interviews were conducted using a consistent 
protocol to increase the reliability of the study. To make the results more generalizable, 
the author eliminated configuration theory concepts that could become too narrowly 
focused or jurisdiction-specific. For example, there was no analysis of the effect of 
technology because jurisdictions rely on so many different technologies in their EOCs. 
Finally, a participant–observer research bias was an obvious risk due to the author’s 
intimate knowledge of the incident and the response efforts. Recognizing that, readers 
should note that the author did not participate directly on any of the three teams. The 
author sought to only add information to fill gaps regarding the facts of the case when the 
interview subject, because of the author’s familiarity with the situation, assumed an 
understanding. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
 This research is exploratory in nature because, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, no study exists that examines how the configuration of an EOC’s staff affects 
                                                 
12 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th ed., Applied Social Research 
Methods Series, vol. 5 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009), 14–16. Yin also listed two other shortcomings of 
case studies: first, that they take too long, and second, that there is a perception that case studies are unable 
to establish causal relationships. 
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its performance. Thus, from a practical perspective, this work is the first analysis of an 
EOC structure’s effectiveness and efficiency using configuration theory. It thus has the 
potential to improve EOCs across the country and to inform emergency management 
doctrine and EOC training. More generally, it adds to the existing body of work that 
comprises configuration theory and is useful for organizations performing work during a 
crisis. 
E. OVERVIEW OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS 
 This thesis uses the perspective of configuration theory to examine three 
workgroups that formed during the Snohomish County EOC’s response to the SR 530 
flooding and mudslides incident. Chapter II provides an overview of the incident and 
describes the overall structure of the EOC and the three workgroups. Chapter III contains 
a literature review that defines configuration theory, its relevant concepts and their 
relationships, and organizational performance. These two chapters create the contextual 
foundation and conceptual backdrop, respectively, for the analysis. 
 Chapter IV describes the research method, outlining the interview process and the 
way the responses were analyzed. Chapter V communicates the findings of the 
interviews. It uses the perspectives of the interview subjects to identify themes salient to 
the performance of their respective groups. Those themes are analyzed using the 
theoretical concepts outlined in Chapter III to show the relationship in each group among 
the contextual factors, the structures that emerged, and workgroup’s performance. This 
chapter also includes a discussion of each group’s configuration. Chapter VI concludes 
this research by describing some of the implications of this research and 
recommendations based on the findings. 
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II. CASE STUDY 
A. BACKGROUND 
Snohomish County, Washington, is a beautiful place to live. Located between 
King County to the south and Skagit County to the north, it is home to approximately 
740,000 residents13 who enjoy topography that ranges from the saltwater beaches of the 
Puget Sound found on the west side of the county to extensive forests and alpine 
wilderness in the mountains on the east side (see Figure 1). The cities and urban areas 
that comprise just 9% of the county’s 2,090 square miles14 are predominant in southwest 
part of the county. Two river basins, the Snohomish and Stillaguamish, traverse the 
southern and northern portions of the county, respectively. 
Figure 1.  Snohomish County, Washington 
 
Source: Snohomish County Washington, “About Snohomish County,” accessed April 21, 
2015, http://snohomishcountywa.gov/2577/About-Snohomish-County.  
                                                 
13 Office of Financial Management, April 1, 2014 Population of Cities, Towns, and Counties used for 
the Allocation of Selected State Revenues, State of Washington (Olympia: Washington State Office of 
Financial Management, April 1, 2014), http://www.ofm.wa.gov/pop/april1/default.asp. 
14 Snohomish County Washington, “About Snohomish County,” accessed April 21, 2015, 
http://snohomishcountywa.gov/2577/About-Snohomish-County. 
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In addition to its beauty, Snohomish County is also fraught with natural hazards. 
Washington State sits on the edge of the seismically active “Ring of Fire” (see Figure 2), 
and the 2010 Snohomish County Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan (NHMP) listed eight 
natural hazards, including earthquakes, volcanoes, flooding, and “landslides and other 
mass movements.”15 
Figure 2.  Active Volcanoes, Plate Tectonics, and the “Ring of Fire” 
 
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Active Volcanoes, Plate 
Tectonics, and the ‘Ring of Fire,’” Ocean Explorer, August 26, 2010, 
http://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/explorations/05fire/background/volcanism/media/
tectonics_world_map.html. 
 Preparing for those hazards is a core responsibility of the Snohomish County 
Department of Emergency Management (SCDEM). The SCDEM maintains the NHMP 
                                                 
15 TetraTech Engineering and Architecture Services, Snohomish County Natural Hazard Mitigation 
Plan Update, Volume 1: Planning-Area-Wide Elements (Seattle: TetraTech Engineering & Architecture 
Services, September 2010), 8–2, http://snohomishcountywa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/14607. The plan 
listed one technological hazard (dam failure) for a total of nine hazards. Note that Snohomish County 
completed an update to its mitigation plan in 2015. This research cited the 2010 plan because it was current 
at the time of the SR 530 incident. 
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and plans for the hazards it identifies. The most recent addition to Snohomish County’s 
structure, the SCDEM became a county department in 2006. It provides emergency 
management services to the unincorporated parts of the county, 18 incorporated 
jurisdictions, and two tribal nations.16 Despite its newness to the county’s structure, the 
SCDEM is experienced with disaster response. From 2006 to 2013, the department 
responded to seven incidents that became presidential disaster declarations17 and a 
number of other less impactful disasters. 
 As part of its response efforts, the SCDEM maintains the SCEOC. The SCEOC is 
located in Everett, Washington, in a remodeled facility that the SCDEM occupied in 
2012. Its operational floor is approximately 3,000 square feet, and it features current 
audiovisual, information technology, and communications technology. Staffing for the 
SCEOC comes from the SCDEM and organizations named as Emergency Support 
Function (ESF) primary agencies in the Snohomish County Comprehensive Emergency 
Management Plan (CEMP). Prior to the SR 530 incident, the EOC staff structured itself 
in what FEMA’s EOC training refers to as a “hybrid” structure18 that placed the ESF 
representatives within the ICS’s functional groups of Operations, Planning, Logistics, and 
Finance/Administration (see Figure 3). 
This structure worked well in 2010 when Snohomish County participated in an 
Integrated Emergency Management Course at FEMA’s EMI, and again in 2012 during 
the Evergreen Quake Exercise Series. These were exercises, however, and the SCEOC 
had never fully activated in response to an actual disaster. That changed on March 22, 
2014. 
                                                 
16 Snohomish County Washington, “Emergency Management,” accessed April 21, 2015, 
http://www.snohomishcountywa.gov/180/Emergency-Management. 
17 FEMA, “Disaster Declarations for Washington,” accessed April 25, 2015, https://www.fema.gov/
disasters/grid/state-tribal-government/89?field_disaster_type_term_tid_1=All. 
18 Federal Emergency Management Agency, IS-775: EOC Management and Operations (Emmitsburg, 
MD: Emergency Management Institute, September 19, 2012), sec. 3.  
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B. THE INCIDENT: THE SR 530 FLOODING AND MUDSLIDES 
On Saturday, March 22, 2014, the deadliest mudslide in U.S. history occurred in 
Snohomish County, Washington. On that date, at 10:37 a.m., a massive slope released 
from a hillside east of the unincorporated community of Oso and raced south. It created 
an earthen dam that blocked the Stillaguamish River and slammed into the Steelhead 
Haven housing development. The force of the slide immediately destroyed 35 homes; 
subsequent flooding caused by the earthen dam would destroy or damage 20 more 
structures. When it stopped moving, approximately 10 million cubic yards of debris 
covered an area nearly one square mile, including approximately 2,000 linear feet of SR 
530. In some places, the debris was 75 feet deep. The area affected by the mudslide is 
shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Snohomish County, Washington, Mudslide of 2014 
 
Source: FEMA and USGS, “2014 Washington Mudslide” (Lynnwood, WA: FEMA 
Region 10, March 25, 2014), https://regions.services.femadata.com/arcgis/rest/services/
FEMA_RX/NGA_Mudslide_Flooding_Extents_30242014/MapServer. 
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 At 10:45 a.m., dispatchers issued the first callouts to response agencies; 
meanwhile, local residents learned of the slide and came to help. Responders and 
volunteers extracted 14 survivors; 13 of them survived. Over the next several weeks, 
dozens of local, state, and federal agencies deployed resources to assist in the search and 
recovery efforts. These personnel worked side by side with volunteers and equipment 
operators from the local communities, building a road to gain access to the debris field 
and tirelessly searching the debris. Eventually, they recovered all 43 of the victims. 
 While the search and rescue and subsequent search and recovery efforts were the 
priority, the slide caused a number of other issues. In its immediate aftermath, there were 
concerns that the earthen dam might fail catastrophically and send a wall of water 
downstream toward the city of Arlington, Washington. With SR 530 blocked, the 30-
minute drive from Darrington to Arlington became a two-and-a-half-hour trip. Gaining 
access to the debris field required substantially improving a road typically used to check 
power lines. The slide also destroyed the fiber line that ran alongside the road, 
temporarily disrupting 911 dispatch services along with landline telephone and Internet 
service east of the slide.  
Numerous agencies came to assist the survivors, some of whom had lost 
everything. Those survivors were not just in the immediate vicinity of the slide; it 
affected the entire Stillaguamish River Valley, which includes citizens and businesses in 
the town of Darrington, city of Arlington, three tribal nations (the Sauk-Suiattle, 
Stillaguamish, and Tulalip), and unincorporated Snohomish County. Managing all of 
these efforts—those focused on the victims and those focused on the survivors—was a 
massive undertaking. A series of incident management teams oversaw the efforts of the 
searchers in the immediate area of the slide. The SCEOC supported these teams and 
addressed the regional issues. 
C. THE SNOHOMISH COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER 
At 12:17 p.m. on March 22, the SCEOC activated. At first, the SCDEM staff that 
manned the SCEOC focused on gathering information and ascertaining the scale of the 
disaster. As the magnitude of the disaster became more apparent, it notified additional 
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ESF agencies. Those agencies provided more staff, and the SCEOC began supporting 
resource requests for the search efforts. In addition to the situational awareness and 
resources it provided to the incident site, the SCEOC staff identified support for the 
survivors, helped establish mechanisms for managing volunteers and donations, and 
coordinated communications between multiple jurisdictions and legal authorities. 
Eventually, every ESF became involved, and for the first time, the SCEOC was fully 
activated for a “real world” incident. 
During this response, the SCEOC implemented a structure similar to the one it 
used in the 2012 exercise. This research analyzes three of the EOC’s teams to determine 
how their respective task environment impacted them, what types of structural properties 
they incorporated, and how they perceived their performance; it also discusses how each 
workgroup configured itself. The three groups were those that handled logistics, planned 
for debris clearing, and attended to the human service needs of the survivors. 
1. Logistics: The SCEOC Logistics Section 
 The SCEOC established its Logistics Section shortly after it activated for the SR 
530 incident. A core responsibility of an EOC is to provide resources to support an 
incident response,24 and resource management relies on standardized processes.25 The 
SCEOC had practiced its resource management processes during previous exercises and 
smaller scale disasters. It had not, however, implemented those processes for an incident 
of this magnitude. 
 During this incident, the section interacted with dozens of local, state, and federal 
agencies and processed an extraordinary (for Snohomish County) volume and diversity of 
resource orders, many of which needed to be filled with a measure of immediacy. The 
responders from these agencies needed food, showers, and places to sleep; they also 
needed augmentation of their personal gear to ensure their safety and ability to 
communicate with each other. A variety of heavy machinery was needed, first to gain 
access to the debris field and, when access was established, to help the searchers combing 
                                                 
24 DHS, “National Incident Management System,” 66. 
25 Ibid., 33. 
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through a combination of displaced earth, trees, shattered houses, vehicles, and personal 
belongings. These machines, and the fuel and parts needed to support them, had to be 
ordered.  
 There were also specialized resource requirements. Everything leaving the site 
needed to be decontaminated because of the presence of hazardous household materials; 
this necessitated a decontamination unit. Personal belongings of the affected families had 
to be carefully cleaned and stored. Managing the river’s channel required specialized 
equipment and expertise, as did monitoring the hillside from which the slide originated. 
There were resources needed to ensure the security of the scene, to treat the human and 
canine searchers that experienced medical problems, and to provide information to the 
media. 
 The Logistics Section processed all of these resource requests, many more than it 
ever had previously. Typically staffed with less than 10 people, it was consistently staffed 
with approximately double that number in an attempt to keep pace with the resource 
demands. Many of those extra staff members came from agencies outside of Snohomish 
County. 
2. Debris Clearing: The SR 530 Task Force 
 Disaster managers prioritized clearing SR 530 very early in the response to the 
mudslide. The blockage of the road meant that residents east of the slide were faced with 
extended travel times to the west—to the jobs, schools, and services found along the I-5 
corridor. It also prevented eastbound traffic, particularly the summer tourists upon whom 
local businesses relied, from reaching the outdoor recreational opportunities abundant in 
the eastern half of the Stillaguamish Valley. The SR 530 Task Force, composed of 20 to 
40 experts from different agencies, was tasked to figure out how to remove hundreds of 
thousands of cubic yards of debris of various types26 and open the road as quickly as 
possible.  
                                                 
26 Interview Subject C, SR 530 Task Force, December 18, 2014. 
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 The presence of so many specialists was warranted. They were faced with the 
unique problem of balancing the competing needs to deliberately and thoroughly search 
the debris for remains and irreplaceable personal belongings with expeditiously removing 
the material so traffic could resume. Debris clearing had been done before in the county; 
the Snohomish County Disaster Debris Management Plan is one of the few FEMA-
approved debris management plans in the region, and it had been partially implemented 
during previous weather and flooding incidents in the county. The presence of the 
remains, however, created an unprecedented situation. With the plan, the SR 530 Task 
Force had a starting point, but the experts needed to adjust it to this situation. 
3. Human Services: The Multiagency Task Force 
The Human Services Multiagency Task Force formed to meet the needs of the 
survivors. The powerful mudslide claimed 43 victims; it left many survivors who 
included the victims’ relatives, neighbors, and members of the affected communities. 
Those communities included neighborhoods, incorporated jurisdictions, and three tribes. 
The survivors’ needs were in some cases immediate, and in almost every case diverse. 
They ranged from food and shelter to the replacement of entire households. Many of the 
survivors were also coping with the loss of friends and loved ones.  
 At times, there were nearly 200 representatives from numerous agencies who 
worked to meet the spectrum of needs. The agencies and their representatives were nearly 
as disparate as the needs themselves and included public, private, and nonprofit entities. 
Some of them already had a presence in the affected communities; many came from 
throughout the state and country. Some provided disaster assistance as part of their 
regular operations, and others were operating in this environment for the first time. All of 
them were focused on assisting the survivors. 
D. SUMMARY 
 The SR 530 flooding and mudslides incident was the deadliest mudslide in U.S. 
history. It involved hundreds of responders, and the initial response phase lasted nearly 
six weeks. Supporting these efforts was the staff of the SCEOC. 
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 To address specific tasks, a number of workgroups formed from within the 
overarching construct of the SCEOC. This research examines three of those workgroups 
using configuration theory’s concepts to demonstrate how understanding the relationship 
between task environment and organization can benefit emergency managers and EOC 
staff. The next chapter explains those concepts as described in the literature reviewed for 
this research. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This research follows configuration theory in contending that the staff in an EOC 
will perform more effectively and efficiently if it organizes to match its tasks27 and task 
environment. Configuration theory, an extension of structural contingency theory, states 
that systematic relationships exist between an organization’s task environment (e.g., how 
complex or unstable it is) and its gestalt or configuration of organizational features (e.g., 
centralization, formalization, and standardization), and that a closer fit between the task 
environment and structural features results in a greater likelihood of successful 
performance. 
 This chapter follows this theory in presenting concepts and relationships of 
configuration theory to hypothesize how EOC units need to be structured to have higher 
likelihoods of effectively performing their tasks in the task environments. It discusses the 
characteristics of environments, features of organizations, and how these features form 
configurations that explain and predict organizational performance. This provides a 
foundation in theory and research to identify ways to improve EOC performance and 
effectiveness. 
A. CONFIGURATION THEORY 
 Organizational theory was defined by Daft as “a macro examination of 
organizations … concerned with people aggregated into departments and 
organizations.”28 A branch of organizational theory is structural contingency theory, 
which argues that fitting organizational characteristics to different contingencies results 
in higher organizational performance.29 Configuration theory developed from, and 
expanded the tenets of, contingency theory.30 Like contingency theory, configuration 
                                                 
27 Kenneth W. Thomas and Betty A. Velthouse, “Cognitive Elements of Empowerment: An 
‘Interpretive’ Model of Intrinsic Task Motivation,” Academy of Management Review, 15, no. 4 (October 
1990): 668. Thomas and Velthouse defined a task as “a set of activities directed toward a purpose.” 
28 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory & Design, 11th ed. (Mason, OH: South-Western, 2013), 35. 
29 Lex Donaldson, The Contingency Theory of Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001), 2. 
30 Donaldson, “The Contingency Theory of Organizational Design,” 22. 
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theory emphasizes the necessity of fit,31 but it is more inclusive in that “rather than trying 
to explain how order is designed into the parts of an organization … [it] explain[s] how 
order emerges from the interaction of those parts as a whole.”32 Henry Mintzberg was a 
founder of configuration theory and offered the extended configuration hypothesis, which 
states that, “effective structuring requires a consistency among the design parameters and 
the contingency factors.”33 This research relied heavily on this premise34 and the 
propositions of Mintzberg’s theory. 
B. THE TASK ENVIRONMENT 
 Mintzberg and Daft saw the environment as a contingency factor that affects an 
organization’s structural properties; they defined the organizational environment as 
everything outside of the boundary of the organization.35 They divided the environment 
into segments, but not all environmental factors were relevant to this analysis because, as 
Mintzberg indicated, “It is not the environment per se that counts but the organization’s 
ability to cope with it – to predict it, comprehend it, deal with its diversity, and respond 
quickly to it.”36 The critical part of the environment, from the perspective of operations, 
is the task environment. The task environment is everything outside of the organization 
that directly affects the organization.37 To Mintzberg, it was the milieu in which an 
organization must respond when designing itself, and he identified dimensions of the task 
environment that are relevant to this research.38  
                                                 
31 Christiane Demers, Organizational Change Theories: A Synthesis (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
2007), 47. 
32 Meyer, Tsui, and Hinings, “Configurational Approaches to Organizational Analysis,” 1178. 
33 Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations (Edgewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1983), 122. 
34 The term design parameters includes characteristics of individuals and units. The focus of this 
research is the unit; therefore it uses the term structural properties in place of design parameters. 
35 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 136; Daft, Organization Theory & Design, 11th ed., 148. 
36 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 137. 
37 Daft, Organization Theory & Design, 11th ed., 148. 
38 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 135. 
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 While the environment is key, it represents only one of several contingency 
factors that affect an organization’s configuration. Other contingency factors include the 
age and size of the organization, its technical system, the experience, knowledge and 
professionalism of its people, the power relationships within the organization,39 as well 
as its goals and strategies.40 In regard to the present case study, some factors characterize 
the entire organization and each unit comprising it; for example, each unit shares the 
overarching mission of the EOC. However, the units have different tasks and task sub-
environments, and they vary in size and their implementation of the structural properties 
described later in the literature review. For example, when tasks and task environments 
are more complex, then contingency theorists hypothesize that effectiveness is more 
likely to be achieved by decentralization. When the task environment is more stable and 
tasks more routine, greater effectiveness is likely to result from more reliance on 
coordinating through standardized processes and skills. 
 The idea that there is no one best doctrinal solution to all environments and all 
problems is developed in the following sections, in terms of task environments that are 
characterized by dimensions of complexity, instability, and hostility. These are mapped 
onto Figure 5. That figure shows the horizontal dimension of complexity ranging from 
simple to complex. The vertical dimension ranges from stable to dynamic or unstable. As 
the discussion that follows explains, hostility can range in complexity, but typically is 
indicative of an unstable task environment. 
  
                                                 
39 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 121. 
40 Daft, Organization Theory & Design, 11th ed., 17. This research asserts that Daft used the term 
culture very similarly to the way in which Mintzberg used power. 
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Figure 5.  Dimensions of Tasks and the Task Environment 
 
 
Adapted from Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations 
(Edgewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983). 
1. Complexity 
 The simplicity or complexity of the task environment and tasks can be defined in 
two ways. One of those is in terms of the levels of knowledge required to do the work. 
Thus, the amount and variety of knowledge required to complete tasks is commensurate 
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with the complexity of those tasks.41 Complexity can also be defined in terms of the 
number of external influences, including other organizations or stakeholders with which 
the organization needs to interact and the interdependence of those influences or 
stakeholders.42 Both definitions are salient to this research. 
 Figure 5 shows that the task environment ranges from simple to complex. As 
discussed later, the organization is more likely to be effective if its configuration is 
adapted to fit its place on this spectrum. For example, different modes of coordination 
(e.g., standardized operating processes) are hypothesized to be more appropriate in 
simple environments versus complex environments; this is discussed further in following 
sections. 
2. Stability 
 Stable environments can be differentiated from unstable environments in terms of 
their rates or speed of change and sometimes in terms of the variability of those rates, or 
what is sometimes referred to as volatility (e.g., stock markets). Daft stated that a stable 
environment remains unchanged for long or extended periods of time, while an unstable 
environment is one in which environmental conditions change rapidly.43 Mintzberg 
defined an unstable environment as one in which change is unpredictable.44 This research 
used both of these definitions. In addition, following Perrow,45 stable environments can 
be seen as creating conditions where the work processes of the organization are more 
likely to be routine. 
 Figure 5 depicts a spectrum of the task environment that ranges from stable to 
unstable (also referred to as dynamic). An organization’s place on this spectrum affects 
its configuration. Mintzberg indicated that organizations in stable environments perform 
                                                 
41 Daft, Organization Theory & Design, 11th ed., 17. 
42 Daft, Organization Theory & Design, 11th ed., 153. 
43 Ibid., 154. 
44 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 136. Mintzberg noted that some change, such as growth in demand, 
could be predicted. 
45 Charles Perrow, “A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Organizations,” American 
Sociological Review, April 1967, 198–201. 
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routine tasks that rely on standardized behavior, while dynamic, rapidly changing 
environments require organizations that use more flexible and less formal structures.46 
Organizations facing crises may be viewed as encountering unpredictable, unstable 
conditions and novel problems that require varied and non-routine work processes. In the 
present case study, the organization and its units were working to stabilize a crisis 
environment. 
3. Hostility 
 The final dimension of the task environment salient to this research is hostility. 
Hostility is defined as threats to the organization created by a lack of critical resources.47 
For the purposes of this research, time is one such resource. Mintzberg supported this, 
writing that the speed of necessary responses represents an intermediate variable through 
which hostility affects organizations and its people.48 
 Hostility directly affects the organization because, as Mintzberg recognized, 
“hostile environments are typically dynamic [unstable] environments”49 (see Figure 5). 
Mintzberg also hypothesized that extreme hostility drives an organization to temporarily 
centralize its structure.50 Configurational theory states that effective organizations have 
structural properties that are appropriate for their environment. The characteristics of 
organizations well adapted to complex, unstable, and hostile environments will be 
holistically different from organizations in different environments. The structural 
properties of units must also fit where they are in the environmental field illustrated in 
Figure 6. The next section covers specific structural properties or characteristics that 
make up the configuration. 
                                                 
46 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 138. Mintzberg also emphasized that dynamic conditions have more 
influence than stable conditions, noting that dynamic environments may move a bureaucracy toward 
organic behavior but not the opposite. 
47 Ibid., 137. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 141. 
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C. STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES OF THE ORGANIZATION OR ITS UNITS 
 The way units are grouped and how an organization coordinates its activities are 
parts of what Mintzberg characterized as the “superstructure” of an organization.51 This 
section examines structural properties relevant to this research that compose the 
superstructure. 
1. Unit Grouping and Size 
 Organizations group individuals and units to enhance coordination, share 
resources, create a supervisory hierarchy, achieve shared goals, or any combination of 
those.52 There are a number of ways to group units; functional grouping is the type of 
grouping salient to this research. Functional grouping “places together employees who 
perform similar functions or work processes or who bring similar knowledge and skills to 
bear.”53 Mintzberg noted that functional structures are typically more bureaucratic,54 and 
bureaucracies function better in stable task environments.55 
 Unit size is the number of positions within a group56 or simply, “the number of 
employees.”57 Unit size is not the same as span of control, a critical distinction that is 
relevant to this thesis. Span of control is the number of people reporting to a supervisor.58 
In emergency management doctrine, span of control is “the key to effective and efficient 
incident management.”59 Mintzberg stated that span of control reflects just one way 
(direct supervision) to coordinate efforts.60 He proposed relationships between unit size 
                                                 
51 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 45. 
52 Daft, Organization Theory & Design, 11th ed., 108; Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 46–47. 
53 Daft, Organization Theory & Design, 11th ed., 108. 
54 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 59. 
55 Ibid., 144. 
56 Ibid., 65. 
57 Daft, Organization Theory & Design, 11th ed., 20. 
58 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 65; Daft, Organization Theory & Design, 11th ed., 18. 
59 DHS, “National Incident Management System,” 47. According to the NIMS, the span of control of 
any individual with incident management supervisory responsibility should range from three to seven 
subordinates, with five being optimal. During a large-scale law enforcement operation, eight to 10 
subordinates may be optimal.  
60 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 66. 
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and other ways to coordinate their efforts. For example, he stated that compared with 
direct supervision, standardized work facilitates larger unit sizes, and a greater reliance 
on mutual adjustment leads to smaller unit sizes.61 
2. Achieving Coordination 
 Coordinating tasks is one of the most fundamental purposes of an organization.62 
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) defines multiagency coordination as 
“a process by which all levels of government and all disciplines work together more 
effectively and efficiently.”63 Mintzberg identified four modes of coordination that are 
salient to the EOC. Each is discussed briefly in the following paragraphs and described to 
illustrate its relative fit with different task environments that confront the organization or 
unit. These modes of coordination are “the glue that holds organizations together.”64 
Each thus has its appropriate position in Figure 6. 
 Mutual adjustment is the basic person-to-person communication that occurs 
between co-workers and colleagues. It is the most informal means of coordination.65 
Direct supervision relies on supervisors to coordinate the efforts of their subordinates. In 
incident management, direct supervision is often accomplished through the 
implementation of the doctrinal concepts of span of control66 and unity of command.67 
 Organizations may use various types of standardization to coordinate their work, 
including the standardization of work processes and standardization of skills. Emergency 
                                                 
61 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 66–68. 
62 Ibid., 2. 
63 DHS, “National Incident Management System,” 64. 
64 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 4. 
65 Ibid., 7. 
66 DHS, “National Incident Management System,” 47. According to the NIMS, the span of control of 
any individual with incident management supervisory responsibility should range from three to seven 
subordinates, with five being optimal. During a large-scale law enforcement operation, eight to 10 
subordinates may be optimal. 
67 Ibid., 48. Unity of command means that all individuals have a designated supervisor to whom they 
report, which clarifies reporting relationships and eliminates the confusion caused by multiple, conflicting 
directives.  
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management doctrine emphasizes standardization,68 and in an EOC, the use of a standard 
operating procedure (SOP) is an example of the standardization of work processes. An 
EOC’s forms are standardized to provide consistent products in the context of a set of 
standardized procedures. Finally, there is the standardization of skills or knowledge that 
is achieved by meeting standards of education or training necessary to complete a task; 
this involves a certification that employees have met standards and can thus meet 
expected performance standards.69 Training, like plans, is ingrained in the emergency 
management culture, and standardizing training is a goal of the NIMS.70 
Plans are ubiquitous to EOC operations and salient to this research; their place as 
a distinct coordinating mechanism varied in the literature. James Thompson considered 
them a distinct method that required less stability and routine than standardized methods 
of coordinating, making them more suitable for dynamic environments.71 Mintzberg did 
not see plans as a distinct coordinating mechanism. He stated that action plans identify 
desired outputs based on future scenarios; he also considered them a bridge between the 
standardization of work processes and outputs.72 
Mintzberg hypothesized a relationship between these mechanisms and the task 
environment, and Figure 6 maps this relationship. These are not static relationships; 
Mintzberg advocated flexibility in the use of coordination mechanisms and recognized 
that organizations, and the units within them, might use any (or all) of the coordination 
                                                 
68 DHS, “National Incident Management System,” 7. In its “Concepts and Principles” section, the 
NIMS contains a separate paragraph entitled “Standardization” that states, “Flexibility to manage incidents 
of any size requires coordination and standardization among emergency management/response personnel 
and their affiliated organizations. The NIMS provides a set of standardized organizational structures that 
improve integration and connectivity among jurisdictions and disciplines, starting with a common 
foundation of preparedness and planning. Personnel and organizations that have adopted the common 
NIMS framework are able to work together, thereby fostering cohesion among the various organizations 
involved in all aspects of an incident. NIMS also provides and promotes common terminology, which 
fosters more effective communication among agencies and organizations responding together to an 
incident.” 
69 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 6. 
70 DHS, “National Incident Management System,” 20. 
71 James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory, 
reprint (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 56. 
72 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 73.  
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mechanisms simultaneously.73 He did, however, indicate that in general, across situations 
and time, patterns related to effectiveness result. Thus, this thesis proposes that separate 
units in an EOC may use different coordination mechanisms to complete their tasks more 
effectively and efficiently in distinct sub-environments. 
Figure 6.  Coordination Mechanisms in the Task Environment 
 
 
Adapted from Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations 
(Edgewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983). 
                                                 
73 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 7. 
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 Mutual adjustment is both the most fundamental means of coordination and the 
means to which the organization returns to accommodate the need to adapt in the most 
complex environments.74 In the most complex and highly interdependent environments, 
when the use of mutual adjustment becomes mandatory, organizations turn to liaison 
devices to improve communication and information flows.75 Liaison structures 
encourage and help bring order to the informal communications that occur during mutual 
adjustment.76 In 1973, Jay Galbraith identified seven such structural devices that he 
proposed occurred on a continuum that ranged from simple to complex.77 A decade later, 
Mintzberg narrowed that list to four types: liaison positions, task forces, integrating 
managers, and matrix structures.78 The first three are relevant to this research. 
 According to Daft and Mintzberg, liaisons actively promote closer contact 
between two units.79 The NIMS describes the liaison as a more reactive role, saying that 
a liaison acts as a “point of contact for representatives of other governmental departments 
and agencies, NGOs, and/or the private sector (with no jurisdiction or legal authority) to 
provide input on their organization’s policies, resource availability, and other incident-
related matters.”80 All three agreed that liaisons fulfill these responsibilities without 
formal authority. Daft and Mintzberg defined a task force as a group of equals assembled 
temporarily to address specific problems or issues.81 Emergency management doctrine 
defined a task force as a planned or ad hoc assembly of disparate resources gathered to 
perform a specific response-related mission under the direction of a supervisor with the 
authority to exercise direct supervision over the task force.82 The integrating manager is a 
designated liaison who is delegated formal authority over decisions involving multiple 
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departments, but not over the actions of the other departments’ personnel.83 Daft stated 
that the person filling this role often comes from an outside department.84 Like the 
coordinating mechanisms, organizations implement liaison devices as necessary, and 
different parts of an organization may turn to different liaison devices to fulfill their 
needs. 
 Coordination is both necessary and, especially during disasters, difficult. 
According to Mintzberg, the need to coordinate is one of two reasons organizations 
exist,85 and coordination has long been considered at the center of EOC operations.86 
However, coordination during disasters has historically been extremely challenging;87 Au 
contended that poor coordination represents a primary reason that the response to large-
scale disasters goes poorly.88 This may be the result of mismatches between 
organizational design and the environment. 
3. Decentralization 
The delegation of formal power to make choices and decisions defines 
decentralization.89 During disasters, elected leaders may “decentralize” their authority in 
a formal manner through a Delegation of Authority.90 Mintzberg indicated that in some 
organizations decentralization occurred selectively, meaning that it happened “where the 
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information concerning the decisions … [can] be accumulated most effectively.”91 He 
also recognized a relationship between selective decentralization and other aspects of the 
organizations; specifically, he saw that selective decentralization was associated with 
functional groups and relied on mutual adjustment and liaison devices to coordinate the 
efforts of those groups.92 
 There are three additional characteristics of decentralization that are relevant to 
this research. The first is that a need for subject matter expertise blurs the line between 
formal decision-making authority and the power to advise.93 An example is when 
managers rely so heavily on subject-matter experts that making decisions becomes a 
shared responsibility. Second, the greater the complexity of the environment, the more 
decentralized the organization’s structure.94 This allows the organization to segment the 
complex environment, with each decentralized unit having control over parts of the task 
environment. Last, extreme hostility pushes organizations to temporarily centralize their 
structure so that they may react more quickly.95 When extreme hostility occurs in 
otherwise complex environments, the organization must balance the need to decentralize 
to better understand the environment with the need to respond to the threat.96 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS 
 An organization’s configuration comprises its structural properties and 
mechanisms used to organize and coordinate its tasks and effectively adapt it to its task 
environment.97 Structure creates formal reporting relationships; places individuals into 
teams and teams into departments; and establishes systems by which to communicate, 
coordinate, and integrate across the structure.98 Configuration meshes the elements of 
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these together into “natural clusters.”99 Mintzberg described five configurations: Simple 
Structure, Machine Bureaucracy, Professional Bureaucracy, Divisionalized Form, and 
Adhocracy. This section describes four of those configurations, omitting the 
Divisionalized Form because of its focus on markets and market diversity.100 These four 
configurations and their characteristics are portrayed in Figure 7.  
 A small organization led by, and heavily reliant upon, a single leader exemplifies 
the Simple Structure. The Simple Structure is a best fit for task environments that are 
simple and unstable and where the work is routine.101 Its leader coordinates activities 
using direct supervision and maintains centralized decision-making power. That 
centralization, along with the Simple Structure’s lack of bureaucracy, makes it flexible 
and responsive to hostile environments.102 The simple structure is the football team, its 
leader the quarterback. 
 The assembly line factory is the stereotypical Machine Bureaucracy. Machine 
Bureaucracies perform their tasks with consistency and efficiency gained from 
standardized work processes. This configuration’s decisions emanate from an established 
chain of command, and its favored task environment is simple and stable. This suits the 
Machine Bureaucracy because its reliance on a standardized process makes it slow to 
respond to novel situations; it also affords this configuration the opportunity to develop 
and refine plans and procedures to generate efficiency. Introduce issues not covered by 
those established procedures, however, and its limited ability to innovatively solve 
problems risks crippling its performance. In novel situations, a leader may provide 
direction; thus, when confronting change (including change generated by hostility), the 
Machine Bureaucracy temporarily reverts to processes more characteristic of the Simple 
Structure.103  
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 A group of highly trained employees, often considered “professionals,” 
authorized to make decisions based on its expertise characterizes the Professional 
Bureaucracy. This is academia, in which educators maintain control over their curricula 
and classrooms and coordinate their activities primarily through decentralized decision-
making and the standardization of their skills. The environment that favors this 
configuration is stable and complex. Mintzberg recommended that this configuration be 
thought of as a set of “standard programs … that are applied to predetermined situations, 
called contingencies.” When forced out of its expected contingencies, the Professional 
Bureaucracy struggles to adapt quickly. To confront change outside the structure of its 
standardized expertise and skill sets, it must become more adhocratic.104 
 The Adhocracy, like the Professional Bureaucracy, employs highly specialized 
and trained staff, but it relies on mutual adjustment and liaison devices instead of 
standardized skills to coordinate its efforts. Those coordinating mechanisms meld with a 
complex, unstable environment and create a configuration in which professionals focus 
on innovation without the constraints of bureaucracy. Authority in the adhocracy is 
decentralized, and this configuration “shows the least reverence for the classical 
principles of management, especially unity of command.” This somewhat free-flowing 
expertise, operating without a clear chain of command, prioritizes innovation, but does so 
potentially at the cost of efficiency and time.105 NASA, DARPA, and Google have all 
been offered as examples of adhocracies. 
 Each of these configurations possesses unique characteristics that make them 
better suited for particular environments. Figure 5 maps the task environment; Figure 7 
presents the configurations in the task environments in which configuration theory 
suggests they will perform best. 
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Figure 7.  Four Basic Configurations in Their Model Task Environment 
 
 
Adapted from Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations 
(Edgewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983). 
 Daft proposed that few pure structures exist in the real world because 
organizations need the flexibility to respond to ever-changing circumstances.106 
Mintzberg concurred with this, hypothesizing that his configurations become the basis for 
establishing hybrids.107 Hybrid organizations possess the characteristics of two or more 
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of the configurations, and Mintzberg noted that the dimensions of the organizational 
environment generate hybrids. Hostility, for example, drives machine bureaucracies, 
adhocracies, and professional bureaucracies toward a simple structure, creating the 
Simple Bureaucracy, Simplest Structure, and Simple Professional Bureaucracy, 
respectively.108 Other environmental factors produce hybrids, too. Complexity pushes the 
Machine Bureaucracy to take on aspects of the Professional Bureaucracy; it also moves 
the Simple Structure toward Adhocracy. The latter allows for greater input and the use of 
mutual adjustment for problem solving. A stable environment may also result in the 
Simple Structure adopting standardized processes associated with a Machine 
Bureaucracy, where standardized processes replace the need for direct supervision.109 
 A hybrid mentioned by Mintzberg that is particularly appealing to EOCs is one 
that implements different configurations in its different parts.110 This hybrid offers the 
possibility for units within the overall construct of the EOC to configure themselves 
distinctly to address diverse tasks. 
E. ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
 Performance is here defined in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Daft defined 
effectiveness as the extent to which an organization achieves its goals111 and efficiency 
by the amount of resources the organization expends to meet its goals.112 Thus, a high-
performing organization is one that achieves its goals with minimal waste and using the 
fewest resources. 
F. SUMMARY 
 The basic constructs of configurational theory have been presented, and the 
patterned relationships making up four organizational configurations—Simple Structure, 
Machine Bureaucracy, Professional Bureaucracy and Adhocracy—have been described. 
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Each of these has been seen to have a favored task environment and can be characterized 
by specific, dominant modes of coordination appropriate for its different tasks and task 
environments. Centralization or decentralization become appropriate for different 
environmental pressures and tasks, and organizations become hybrids of these pure types 
as they engage changing environmental pressures (e.g., a crisis involving time pressures 
and a hostile, unstable task environment).  
 Figure 7 illustrates a set of specific hypothesized relationships that are tested in 
this case. The overarching hypothesis is that EOC staff will perform better if it organizes 
its superstructure and structural properties to match its tasks and the task environment. 
This idea of “fit” follows structural contingency theory and, by extension, configuration 
theory. It forms the basis for the analysis of nine interviews conducted with responders to 




IV. RESEARCH METHOD 
 This thesis used configuration theory to examine how the task environments and 
structural properties of three workgroups in an EOC impacted their performance; each 
workgroup’s configuration was also described. It used a single case study with embedded 
units of analysis as the research design by which to examine the SCEOC’s response to 
the 2014 SR 530 flooding and mudslides incident. The response to that incident provided 
an ideal research focus because it created a milieu in which multiple groups performed 
separate tasks in distinct environments within the overarching EOC organization. The 
selected workgroups were analyzed individually and compared with each other. 
 This chapter describes how the author conducted nine interviews—three from 
each of the three workgroups selected—and analyzed the qualitative data obtained from 
those interviews. For transparency, the author highlights his role as a participant–
observer who managed the SCEOC for a significant portion of the time it was activated 
in response to the SR 530 incident. That experience afforded unique insights into the 
gathering and analysis of the data; however, to avoid creating biases, the author only 
interjected his perceptions into the interviews when, because of their acknowledgement 
of his understanding of the situation, the respondents left gaps in their answers that 
needed further clarification. The author also used his first-hand experience to clarify the 
context within which participants reported their perceptions. 
A. THE INTERVIEWS 
 This research hypothesizes that using the principles of configuration theory would 
benefit an EOC staff; thus, aspects of configuration theory that appeared during the SR 
530 response were the topics of the interviews. Rubin and Rubin stated that, “the goal of 
topical interviews is to work out a coherent explanation by piecing together what 
different people have said, while recognizing that each person might have his or her own 
construction of events.”113 The author developed coherent descriptions of three groups’ 
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task environments, structural properties, and configurations by interviewing three 
members from each workgroup. 
1. Participants 
 The intent of this research was to focus on the local-level EOC, so the desired 
interview subjects were individuals who worked at the local level of government. The 
Paperwork Reduction Act places limitations on the number of non-federal personnel the 
author could solicit; therefore, the number of interview subjects was limited to nine.114 In 
order to have units to compare and achieve the benefits of a cross-case analysis, those 
nine were divided into three interviews from three teams. Those teams were the SCEOC 
Logistics Section, the SR 530 Task Force, and the Human Services Multiagency Task 
Force. During the disaster response, those groups were responsible for processing the 
resource orders, planning for clearing the debris from SR 530, and providing human 
service support to the survivors, respectively. 
 These groups were selected primarily because they performed distinct tasks on 
different timelines, in what were assumed to be different task environments, and the 
author was aware that the groups organized differently. Thus, the author anticipated that 
the groups implemented different configurations. Consideration was also placed on the 
disparity in the frequency with which each of these tasks are typically performed by an 
EOC, which implied personnel with differing levels of previous experience working 
together as a group and as individuals. All of Snohomish County’s previous EOC 
activations involved a logistics section. Several activations had involved the need for 
debris clearing, albeit on a much more limited scale, and a few had involved delivering 
human service support, but never on the magnitude of this incident. These differences 
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presented the opportunity to analyze distinct organizational design characteristics that 
evolved in different units responding to the same incident. 
 With the groups chosen, the author solicited input from the person managing the 
EOC at the time these workgroups formed. That person was asked to name the one 
individual in each group who had the most significant influence on the team and who met 
two criteria: The person had to work at the local level, in either government or their 
agency, and had to have participated with the group for at least one week. At the end of 
their respective interviews, each of those individuals was asked to name a candidate with 
the same qualifiers, and that person became a participant in the second round of 
interviews. Using the same process with the second participants produced the final round 
of participants. This method removed the author’s input and potential bias from the 
selection process. 
 Each of the interview subjects has extensive experience in his or her field and is 
extremely well respected in the region. Two men and one woman, seasoned emergency 
managers who all had performed logistics during previous disasters and received 
extensive training on disaster logistics, represented the Logistics Section. Likewise, two 
men and one woman represented the SR 530 Task Force. They had different levels of 
familiarity with Snohomish County’s Disaster Debris Management Plan, and all had been 
involved in varying degrees with previous debris-clearing activities. All were part of the 
SR 530 Task Force from its inception until its work was completed. Three women 
represented the Human Services Multiagency Task Force. Two were long-time human 
service providers working in the public sector, while the third worked for a well-known 
non-profit provider of human service support to disaster victims. These nine individuals 




The author conducted nine semi-structured interviews.115 These interviews were 
considered semi-structured because although each individual was asked a set of 
structured questions (prescribed by the interview protocol found in the Appendix), not all 
were asked the same follow-up probing questions. The questions were designed to elicit 
responses about the task environment, the structural properties of the organization, and 
the group’s configuration and performance; the probes were used only when necessary to 
clarify a participant’s response or to ask the participant to elaborate on a particular 
statement or point. Figure 8 contains examples of some of the structured and probing 
questions. 
Figure 8. Sample of Structured and Probing Questions 
115 Because this study included human subjects, the author followed NPS’s policy and submitted the 
interview protocol to the NPS Institutional Review Board (IRB). The IRB determined that review and 
approval were not necessary. 
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The author asked the interviewees to place an X on the line to start the 
conversation and, later, to compare this response to their narrative. The number of 
participants was too small to extrapolate statistically meaningful results, so no 
quantitative conclusions were drawn from the X markings or the questions that asked the 
interviewees to gauge their perception of their group’s level of disaster-related experience 
and training. These latter responses provided additional qualitative characteristics of each 
group. 
 To help ensure the integrity of their responses and to maintain their 
confidentiality, the author took numerous steps to protect the anonymity of the 
participants. The interview protocol specifically stated that their responses “will be used 
in a way that respects and ensures your privacy and all individual contributions will 
remain confidential.” Each interview took approximately one hour and was conducted in 
a private setting selected by the interview subject. The interview began with the author 
reading instructions that reminded the participants that their confidential responses would 
be used for research. The instructions also advised the interview subjects that their 
responses were voluntary and that while the interview was being recorded, they could ask 
for the recorder to be stopped at any time. This was done out of respect to the victims and 
survivors of the incident and, because the author had firsthand knowledge of the 
emotional nature of the tasks and work that would be described, the author’s sensitivity 
toward the participants themselves. Two respondents exercised this option during their 
interviews, but resumed after composing themselves. 
 The interviews were recorded with the interviewees’ permission, and the digital 
recordings were submitted to a transcriptionist via Sakai (a secure file-sharing portal 
provided by the Naval Postgraduate School). The transcriptionist returned digital copies 
of the transcripts via the same portal, and the recordings were destroyed. This was done 
to help protect the participants’ identities. 
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B. ANALYSIS 
 Rubin and Rubin provided the structure for the analysis,116 which began by 
reviewing the transcripts and creating codes based on concepts from configuration theory. 
During this phase, the transcripts were coded for concepts, which Rubin and Rubin 
defined as words or terms, and those concepts were organized into themes, which they 
defined as summary statements and explanations important to the research.117 An 
example of a concept that was coded was a participant’s use of the word “complexity.” 
Because an established theory’s lens may omit original perceptions,118 the author 
considered the concepts within configuration theory’s task environment, structural 
properties, and organizational configurations to be typologies. This allowed discrepancies 
between the perceptions of the participants and established literature’s definitions of 
configuration theory’s concepts to be coded correctly and allowed for the potential 
emergence of novel concepts.  
 Once the transcripts were coded, the analysis began by sorting the codes. The 
author created separate documents for each workgroup that placed the codes from each 
interview side-by-side under the following three categories of themes: 
• Factors that influenced the task environment 
• Structural properties that appeared 
• Attributes and/or characteristics that impacted performance 
The side-by-side view allowed the author to compare and weigh the three perspectives. 
Rubin and Rubin stated that, “in topical studies, you compare and weigh contrasting 
descriptions of events to work out your own interpretation of what happened.”119 In this 
research, the comparison and weighing of the concepts was based primarily on 
prevalence (if two of the three participants held the same view) and how emphatically the 
concept was communicated. For example, additional consideration was given to one 
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interviewee’s perspective if that person repeatedly mentioned, or extensively expounded 
on, the same topic.  
 After the analysis of the individual workgroups, the author conducted a second 
analysis to identify concepts that appeared in all of the workgroups. Its purpose was to 
identify concepts with greater generalized applicability to EOCs. For this analysis, the 
codes from all of the interviews were sorted using the same three thematic categories. 
The codes that appeared in all of the workgroups were then summarized. 
C. SUMMARY 
 This thesis hypothesizes that following configuration theory’s principle of 
matching an organization’s structure to its task environment offers an opportunity to 
improve the performance of an EOC’s staff. The scale and duration of the SCEOC’s 
response to the SR 530 incident provided a unique opportunity to test this using a single 
case study design with three embedded units of analysis. Those embedded units were 
three groups that performed distinct tasks during the response to the case study’s incident. 
 This chapter described how three people from each of those groups were selected 
and interviewed, and the methods used to analyze their responses. All of the interviewees 
played integral roles in their respective groups, and they were asked a series of questions 
during a recorded interview. The author analyzed the transcripts of those interviews using 
configuration concepts to first identify themes within the individual workgroups, and then 
themes that appeared in all of the groups. The next chapter presents the results of those 
analyses and includes a discussion informed by the literature. 
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V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 This thesis hypothesizes that the use of configuration theory may improve the 
performance of the staff working in EOCs. The author, a participant–observer, conducted 
nine interviews with members of three workgroups that formed during the EOC’s 
response to the SR 530 flooding and mudslides incident. The transcripts of those 
interviews were coded and analyzed using definitions and concepts articulated in 
literature reviewed. This chapter presents the findings from those interviews. 
 This is done in two ways. First, separate sections communicate the results from 
each workgroup. Those findings are categorized within the configurational themes 
identified in the previous chapter. The findings are followed by a theory-based discussion 
of each workgroup’s configuration. Another section then articulates the cross-case 
findings and discusses them. Because they appeared in all of the workgroups, these 
findings are considered more generalized. 
A. THE SCEOC LOGISTICS SECTION 
 The task of the SCEOC Logistics Section was to “receive orders from the field for 
supplies, equipment, personnel, crews, overhead, aircraft – everything you could possibly 
imagine – and to fill those orders.”120 Providing such resource support is a fundamental 
purpose of EOCs,121 and the SCEOC had performed this function many times in previous 
exercises and smaller-scale disasters. During those exercises and incidents, the section 
had closely followed doctrine and training in that it relied heavily on centralized 
decision-making by the section chief and a standardized procedure to process resource 
requests. But before the SR 530 incident, the section had not performed its task during 
the response to a large-scale incident. 
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1. Factors that Influenced the SCEOC Logistics Section’s Task 
Environment 
 From the outset, it was difficult for the Logistics Section to understand the scope 
of its task. “I think for the whole first week people in the EOC were still thinking this was 
an active rescue,”122 said one of the interview participants. In fact, all of the rescues had 
occurred on the day of the incident.123 The rescue efforts, however, set in motion a large 
influx of responders whose numbers grew quickly as the rescue efforts transitioned to a 
search for the victims. At first, the section “did not understand the structure they were 
supporting,” and the “geographic dispersal [of the sites needing support] made it 
confusing.”124 
 The responders began ordering items almost immediately and in unprecedented 
numbers. Said one of the interviewees, “I have never experienced that volume of resource 
requests. I have heard other stories of (pauses) yes, people down in Texas, some of the 
hurricane states, and even from wildfires [experiencing this many resource requests].”125 
And these were not just requests for individual items; some of the resources requested 
created their own support requirements, which generated additional resource needs. The 
Type 1 Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces126 were one example of what was 
described as needing “a pretty long logistical tail and other pieces would have to be put in 
place to maximize the benefits of those resources.”127 
 The SCEOC Logistics Section grew to meet the demand. Assistance came from 
agencies around the area that sent personnel to augment the section’s staff; most were 
working in the Snohomish County facility for the first time. They were unfamiliar with 
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the technology and the section’s structure and procedures, and the personnel changed 
often. The extended length of the EOC activation meant that there were “a lot of 
changing faces.”128 Varied lengths of deployments exacerbated the turnover in the 
section’s staff. Some staff members were available “for two or three days [and others] for 
four or five days.”129 At the same time, there was turnover out in the field. The Logistics 
Section, located nearly 40 miles from the incident site, was not always clear on the 
structure of the incident response in the field, and there was “confusion over whether 
there was one EOC out in the field or an ICP or two ICPs and an IMT or two IMTs. It 
was confusing and changed a couple of times, especially in the first week, it changed 
several times.”130 
 One effect of all of the changing personnel was a degree of uncertainty regarding 
with whom to coordinate. There was a sense of “losing some of the connection [of] 
relationships that started for two or three days and then that person is gone.”131 Another 
was that incoming personnel were unfamiliar with the situation. “There were a select few 
who were certain about the job and the task at hand, and knew how to do it,” said one of 
the participants.132 Another stated plainly that a lot of the work “was being done by a lot 
of stakeholders who were from outside the organization [who] didn’t know the processes 
of Snohomish County in the EOC.”133 In the field, the personnel were having a similar 
experience, and the cumulative effect was that “it took a day just to figure out who is who 
in the zoo and what process [was being used].”134  
 The section could ill afford this delay because underpinning all of the SCEOC 
Logistics Section’s efforts was a sense of urgency expressed by every participant. “Time 
had a very large impact, very much of an impact [on the section] … It was very critical,” 
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said one.135 Another added, “Time is definitely an enemy in logistics. There is never 
enough of it, and time is working against us because everybody wants what they need 
ASAP.”136 The responders in the field did want, and need, things as quickly as they could 
get them. Sometimes there were multiple options for filling the requests, and the time 
constraints resulted in quickly made decisions because of the impression that they “didn’t 
have time to sit around and be real creative.”137 At other times, the uniqueness of some 
requests affected the section’s ability to provide the resources in a timely manner and 
added to the pressure. For example, the conditions in the field warranted the ordering of 
dozens of sets of chest waders. The quantity needed overwhelmed the area’s supply, 
which meant that toward the end of the incident, companies on the east coast were filling 
those orders. In the time it took to locate and obtain those resources, the demand in the 
field remained unmet and the pressure mounted. 
 Another issue that the participants felt affected their perception of time was the 
lack of a standardized process. The next section provides their description of how the 
group addressed a lack of standardized process and other structural properties that the 
group implemented. 
2. Structural Properties that Appeared in the SCEOC Logistics Section 
 At the beginning of the response, the Logistics Section organized using “the 
classical ICS model” with one section chief and three people with functional 
responsibilities (i.e., ESF representatives) reporting to the chief,138 but eventually the 
group expanded to approximately 20 people.139 They were placed into functional groups 
based on need (e.g., a fuel group); those smaller groups also helped the section chiefs 
manage the increased number of people performing the work. One participant stated that 
with the potential for so many people to be in the resource ordering process, they should 
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have implemented functional grouping sooner.140 Another added that the section would 
have benefited from having the ability to expand to accommodate additional functional 
groupings, while recognizing that the groups needed to be coordinated.141  
 To achieve coordination, the section’s staff initially tried to use the pre-
established process; in this case, that process was unable to meet the need, and the section 
struggled to settle on a replacement. They needed a very detailed, multi-step process that 
documented all facets of the orders “very distinctly”142 and allowed them to interface 
with the field responders in a way that the section had not previously done while handling 
the large volume of requests.143 The former required time that the group did not 
necessarily have, and there were differing opinions on how best to accomplish the latter, 
a condition exacerbated by turnover in leadership and personnel. “There was a lack of 
technical direction from the logistics leadership from the beginning to clearly articulate 
how a resource request was going to be documented,” said one interviewee, along with 
“very talented individuals that have done logistics. But how they did logistics back home 
wasn’t necessarily the way that … Snohomish County did it.”144 Another respondent 
added, 
Staff coming in here would get used to kind of working under one system 
with one logistics section chief and during the first six to eight days where 
we had all of the turnover … they were all introducing new stuff. I think 
that took its toll on some of the directors and a couple of the logistics 
chiefs.  
Those leaders characterized the evolving process as a “reinventing of the wheel day after 
day.”145 
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 In the midst of the “ever evolving procedural changes,” the section turned to other 
ways to coordinate its efforts, and the section chiefs assumed a key role in this. They 
implemented a shift change briefing. It  
was the only way to get the word out to everybody. We would have a 
huddle and we would have to let the phone ring and we would try to get 
the word out to everybody at the same time and that was really difficult.146  
They also tried to ensure that everyone was operating at the requisite level of 
competence. While many of the people arriving to help were very talented, they did not 
have the same level of training or experience responding to actual disasters. The section 
chiefs developed a “pretty good orientation process” and “were very good at bringing 
those people [with less experience] along.”147 The section chiefs also intervened directly 
to ensure the functional groups coordinated. “Some orders [required] a little bit of each. 
So, you can have an equipment order, but you need a driver. So they [the functional 
groups] have to coordinate and talk. We [the section chiefs] would move them 
together.”148 
 A lack of a common process had other unintended consequences, both good and 
bad. One participant articulated that in this situation, the section’s staff, “needed to have 
freedom to go beyond [a rigid] process” and further elaborated that,  
If you have a process that says call three vendors and then report, and you 
are following the process and you call those vendors and they don’t have 
what you want, you can’t call in [to the requesting agency] and say, 
‘Sorry, we can’t get that.’ You need to be able to move beyond the 
process.149  
The others saw benefits as well. One said there was a “freedom to go and talk to each 
other”150 that resulted in the sharing of an “incredible wealth of communal 
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knowledge.”151 Another agreed that this was an opportunity to “use your knowledge, 
skills, and abilities, and your tools and make the best [of the situation],” although the 
same person felt this sometimes led to people who “worked around the system or they did 
their own [thing].”152 
 As the incident progressed, a common process did emerge. The group developed 
standard operating procedures that used a common request form and spreadsheet for 
tracking resource requests. “We relied on, in the end, a very simple Excel workbook, a 
Microsoft Excel workbook, which was a nice way to track things and take a complex 
thing and kind of boil it down,” said one interviewee.153 The group also turned to 
liaisons, one of whom created a connection between the EOC and the field responders 
and was mentioned by all three of the respondents. One characterized this position as “the 
way to go” because “she [the liaison] was positioned at the EOC so she talked every ten 
minutes with her counterpart in the IMT out in the field.”154 Another shared how having 
someone from the field helped bring clarity to the EOC about the needs of the field. Later 
in the incident, a liaison was also sent from the EOC’s Logistics Section to the incident 
command post (ICP), which further helped bridge the two activities. One of the 
participants filled that role and said,  
I think that liaison role was very important to be able to get up there and 
explain to the [IMT’s] ordering point people what the reality of life was 
back here [in the EOC] and vice versa. … I think every day kind of helped 
defuse things so at least relationally you know those groups are still 
talking. Plus, in the liaison role, being able to de-conflict some of this stuff 
and being able to provide maybe more timely information to all parties on, 
well, here is the status of your stuff.155 
 With so many orders, decisions had to be made about priority and need. Decision-
making vacillated between the staff and the section chiefs. For some of the lesser issues, 
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the staff was “very empowered to make decisions and problem solve on their own.”156 
For most of the issues, and because time was so pressing, there was a clear “hierarchy by 
authority and position power,”157 in which the section chiefs and their deputies had the 
final say. According to one respondent,  
As a group we might come up with some ideas for resolving it, but then 
ultimately it was the deputy and the section chief who had to make the 
final call for how the final problem was to be resolved.158 
3. Perceived Impact on the SCEOC Logistics Section’s Performance 
 Most of the respondents’ remarks about performance focused on how a lack of 
process affected the section’s efficiency. To one of the interviewees, who stated that with 
“all of the tools and the training and the technology that we had, there has to be a more 
efficient way to do that [provide logistical support],” a written process would have meant 
that “the efficiency of the section would have been light years ahead.”159 Another pointed 
out that the lack of one process “overcomplicated things and slowed them down;” it also 
meant that orders were being duplicated, which resulted in people “spending a lot of time 
trying to vet basically what turned out to be triple (pauses) double or triple orders on 
things.”160  
 A lack of standardized process was not the only thing they identified that 
degraded performance. Disparate levels of expertise were also cited, as were different 
levels of experience, both of which were associated with the uniqueness of the situation 
the section faced. As one put it,  
So even if you had a group who had never done it [logistics], if it is a 
simple, simple task you are still going to be able to perform it fairly well 
and be effective. But, the more complex [nature of this incident] coupled 
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with the lack of certainty or lack of training and experience in that 
combined makes the performance and effectiveness start to decline.161 
4. Discussion of the SCEOC Logistics Section’s Configuration 
Before the SR 530 incident, the SCEOC Logistics Section exhibited many 
characteristics of a machine bureaucracy. According to the NIMS, logistics is “the 
process and procedure for providing resources and other services to support incident 
management,”162 and ordering resources should be a standardized process.163 During 
previous disasters and exercises, the SCEOC had developed a standardized resource 
ordering process in which functional groups processed requests that were approved by the 
section chief, who exercised top-down decision-making authority. Because of the short 
duration of those activations (prior to the SR 530 incident, the longest previous activation 
was just a few days), the same people usually staffed the section. The work they 
performed was routine; the task environment in which they operated was simple and 
stable. For example, when activated for flooding (the most prevalent cause of activation) 
the section’s personnel procured readily available resources (usually sand and sandbags) 
for a few partner agencies with which they regularly interacted, and with days of notice. 
The Logistics Section’s reliance on standardized work processes in a simple, stable task 
environment combined with the use of top-down decision-making reflects a machine 
bureaucracy’s configuration. Figure 9 depicts this. 
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Figure 9.  Assumed Configuration of the SCEOC Logistics Section before the 




In response to the task environment it experienced after the case study’s incident, 
and exacerbated by its standardized process becoming overwhelmed, the SCEOC 
Logistics Section’s configuration changed. It assumed a configuration with characteristics 
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of a Simple Structure and an Adhocracy, a hybrid Mintzberg called the Simplest 
Structure.164 This research refers to this as the Simple Adhocracy; Figure 10 depicts it. 
Figure 10.  SCEOC Logistics Section’s Configuration during the SR 530 Incident 
Based on the Analysis of the Interviews 
 
  
The Simple Adhocracy offered the flexibility to address the different tensions 
(“pulls”) experienced by the section, one of which was toward adhocracy. Based on the 
interview responses, the participants from the Logistics Section described a task 
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environment that was complex, unstable, and hostile. In response to that environment, 
and the inability of the established process to keep up with the demand, the staff 
organized in small functional groups that exercised a limited amount of decentralized 
authority and used mutual adjustment to coordinate their efforts. This adhocratic behavior 
allowed the staff to come up with effective solutions to novel problems. 
 The second pull was toward the simple structure. Time constraints generated 
hostility, and as suggested by Mintzberg, that hostility pushed the adhocracy toward the 
simple structure’s configuration.165 These were not only moments of centralized 
decision-making; these were instances when the section chiefs intervened directly to 
coordinate the staff members’ activities. Managing the multifunctional orders (such as the 
one described previously that included a vehicle, fuel, and driver) exemplified the direct 
supervision exercised by the section chief. The tension between these two conditions 
existed almost constantly; thus, the Simple Adhocracy formed. The turnover in staff, and 
subsequent inability to settle on one process, kept them in this configuration until a 
process, and with it a routine, was reestablished. At that point, the Logistic Section was 
able to resume operating more like a Machine Bureaucracy. 
 According to configuration theory, it is not surprising that a strict adherence to 
standardized work processes would conflict with the initial task environment described in 
this case because standardized work processes are capable of getting the work done 
efficiently and reliably where there is stability and little complexity.166 It is clear from 
the responses that there was a strong desire for efficiency and less emphasis on the need 
for effectiveness; however, the latter should not be underestimated. While it was 
important to get resources to the responders quickly, it was equally important to get them 
the correct resources. The use of mutual adjustment in the complex, unstable environment 
may have slowed down the Logistics Section, but it also contributed to problem solving 
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that was “ad hoc” and “evolutionary.”167 From a configuration theorist’s perspective, it 
fits.168 
 This analysis supports the value of configuration theory in an EOC. Emergency 
management doctrine places a heavy emphasis on the use of standardized processes and 
protocols for resource ordering.169 Standardized work processes, mentioned so often as a 
missing component and often perceived as having a negative impact on the organization’s 
performance, are the primary means of coordination in a Machine Bureaucracy, a 
configuration that would have been a poor fit for the environment in which the section 
was operating. Had there not been so many agencies involved and had the staffing 
situation been more consistent (i.e., had it been a simpler and more stable environment), 
perhaps a Machine Bureaucracy could have worked. More specifically for this section, an 
earlier recognition of the task environment might have reduced the concerns about the 
lack of a standard work process. The section chiefs might have recognized the benefit of 
using mutual adjustment and liaisons to develop creative solutions and a shared 
understanding between the EOC and the field, respectively. The latter may have 
mitigated the perception of time constraints. Recognition of the unique aspects of this 
task environment may have also led to the establishment of a set duration for how long 
someone was assigned to the section and the earlier projection of staffing needs. This 
could have ensured that outside agencies had more time to determine their ability to 
provide augmenting staff who may have stabilized the organizational environment. 
  Disaster logistics rely heavily on standardized processes, something ingrained in 
emergency management logisticians through doctrine and training. During the initial 
stages of the response to the incident, the standardized process in place, despite having 
worked well during previous incidents and exercises, proved insufficient. Using 
configuration theory to analyze the interviews revealed a task environment in which the 
use of standardized processes was not the best fit; it also showed ways in which the 
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section’s structure adapted to the task environment. These adaptations helped the section 
to perform its task effectively until a routine environment could be reestablished. 
 Finally, an understanding of configuration theory and of the factors that 
influenced the task environment could have offered opportunities for the section’s leaders 
to mitigate the effects of the task environment on the section. While they could not 
influence the number of agencies with whom they needed to interact, they could have 
instituted stronger parameters on participation that would have brought greater stability to 
the section. 
B. THE SR 530 TASK FORCE 
 The mission of the SR 530 Task Force was “to open SR 530.”170 Composed of a 
number of subject-matter experts, the SR 530 Task Force quickly assembled in the 
aftermath of the incident to plan how to accomplish that mission. It had never worked on 
an incident of this scale, but the SR 530 Task Force did have the benefit of Snohomish 
County’s Disaster Debris Management Plan (DDMP), the tenets of which Snohomish 
County had implemented on a much smaller scale during previous disasters. Although the 
literature reviewed for this research does not agree on the applicability of a plan as a 
coordinating mechanism, the DDMP offered a starting point for the group’s efforts. 
1. Factors that Influenced the SR 530 Task Force’s Task Environment 
 From the outset, the representatives of the SR 530 Task Force realized that 
accomplishing their task would entail working with numerous, diverse agencies. “It [the 
debris management task] involved a lot of other agencies to assist us from the state and 
federal level, local [level], and again the private property owners,” said one 
interviewee.171 Not only were all levels of government represented, but there was also a 
diversity of functions. Another said,  
We had the chief of counsel; we had state PA [Public Assistance]; we had 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, both the green suit and the white 
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shirts; we had surface water; we had solid waste; we had road 
maintenance; we had WSDOT [Washington State Department of 
Transportation], both their construction and procurement people; we had 
Snohomish County environmental; we had engineering services.172  
There were so many agencies working on the issue that one of the participants found that, 
“the complexity initially involved getting the right people to the table.”173 
 Yet, even with so many agencies sending representatives, none of those people 
understood the task because none of them had ever attempted to do what they had been 
tasked to do, which was to address the convolution of personal effects, remains, 
buildings, and woody debris generated by the slide.174 Even the solicited outside 
expertise was of minimal assistance. “When FEMA came in, they said, ‘Yes, we do 
tornadoes and hurricanes and all of this. We have not done this on the scale that you 
have, what you are facing,’” recounted one interviewee; this “stopped the group dead in 
its tracks.”175 The county’s debris management plan helped get it moving again, but “it 
[the plan] didn’t address a number of things just because we had never encountered 
anything like this,” said one respondent.176 “It wasn’t as if it were an earthquake and a 
building fell down,” said another.177 This was a novel situation for the group. 
 It was also one that required the group to synchronize its work across several 
concurrent efforts. Sometimes those concurrent efforts were obvious, and sometimes they 
were not; all had potential impacts on the SR 530 Task Force. For example, it was 
straightforward that victims were still being found and identified, and that meant that 
“working with the medical examiner was fairly dynamic because we were doing this 
planning while they were still actually kind of in recovery.”178 At the same time, the 
group was less clear on other decisions. One recalled wondering, “if we are going in this 
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direction [with the debris removal planning] and thinking that a dike is going to go in, but 
[then if] it’s not going to go in, how does that impact our operation?”179 The physical 
conditions on the ground also changed rapidly, in large part because of the weather. 
“Once it rained on it [the debris field], it immediately turned into a difficult if not almost 
impossible place to work;” this posed a significant problem, as the task force was intent 
on “getting in and getting out throughout the rainy season.”180 The threat of weather 
constantly and unpredictably threatened to disrupt the timeline, and time was the primary 
motivator for the SR 530 Task Force.  
 The desire to get the road open quickly was palpable. “The overriding timeline 
was, well, open the road yesterday,” so “the time criticality was really driving the group,” 
said one participant.181 The task force wanted to restore access to Darrington and the 
affected area east of the slide; it also had to comply with policies that required the task 
force to complete its work within specific time frames. Said one participant, “the big 
concern that we had was the window of opportunity, meaning when we were given time 
from FEMA for notice of award for the contract to getting it done before the rainy 
season.” That window of opportunity was weeks, not the minutes or hours often 
associated with disaster response. But for the work they were trying to accomplish, “A 
month sounds like a pretty long time, but in reality a month was not much.”182 Another 
participant agreed, stating, “We did some pretty amazing work in a very short amount of 
time. People worked some significant hours. There were some of us that worked 20 hours 
a day.”183 
 Those 20-hour days were indicative of how impactful time was on the workgroup; 
its influence pervaded the group’s activities. The number of participating agencies 
working together and the lack of previous experience in performing this type of debris 
clearing also affected the task environment; that task environment helped shape the 
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workgroup’s structure. The next section describes the SR 530 Task Force’s structural 
properties. 
2. Structural Properties that Appeared in the SR 530 Task Force 
 The SR 530 Task Force’s size ranged from 20 to 40;184 at times the meetings 
were “standing room only.”185 The Task Force formed smaller workgroups based on 
need. “If water was an issue, which it clearly was, there was a water group. If the disposal 
of materials was an issue, there was a disposal group,” shared one of the interview 
subjects, who added that the participants were allowed to “self-select into their area of 
expertise.”186  
 All three interviewees highlighted the high level of expertise within the group.187 
“Just in terms of people that came to the table, [they] were expert in their field so they 
were very capable,” was one’s characterization.188 The interviews also articulated the 
freedom with which those experts interacted. Two of the three interviewees considered 
them a group of equals,189 and the third said that, “Everybody had a voice.”190 The 
expertise and ability to work together freely was important in a situation where “we need 
someone who can help us creatively solve the problem and not just pull out the rulebook 
that says you need to do X, Y, and Z.”191 With the ability to interact as they did, the 
members of the SR 530 Task Force did a “lot of bouncing wild ideas off of each 
other.”192 It was an atmosphere in which “no one’s idea was [considered] ridiculous, so 
that we could at least take what they [the various members of the group] were saying and 
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maybe add it as an alternative.”193 The group’s members were also free to solicit input 
and assistance from agencies outside of the group.194 
 To orchestrate the group’s efforts, one agency provided an individual who 
“helped to facilitate meetings and directed meetings; took notes in meetings; [and] helped 
to define certain roles and responsibilities.”195 That position exercised some authority, 
but it was not formally designated as the leader. Rather, this facilitator’s job was to “rein 
the larger group in just to keep them on task and on focus. But, there wasn’t a real org 
chart or anything to it. It [the organization] was flat all the way across.”196 Still, one of 
the interviewees recalled that this person had enough authority to manage the number of 
participants. According to one participant, the person “threw out four different debris 
contractors” and was able to “pare FEMA down to three or four key representatives and 
[limit] each department in Snohomish County;” other agency participants were “invited 
to go and do other work.”197 
 Regarding overall authority, there were disparate perspectives. On one hand, 
“everybody at the table were [sic] there because [their] superiors had authorized them to 
do what was necessary.”198 In the time-constrained environment, however, the need to 
move past discussions and on to the next decision resulted in one agency, or even one 
person, making the final call. The input of the task force members was valuable, but “I 
think you tend to beat it [the potential solution] to death too much,” said one.199 The 
answer to that was, according to another, “at some point in time I just had to say okay, we 
are done. We have to make a decision to keep moving things forward.”200 When it came 
to those decisions, a single decision-maker decided. 
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3. Perceived Impact on the SR 530 Task Force’s Performance 
 The interview subjects expressed differing perspectives of the group’s 
performance. According to one, “We nailed it. … Because we created a space where 
everybody was equal.”201 The others were less definitive in their assessments. One said, 
“It was very effective given the circumstances and what we came up with for a solution 
led to a successful outcome in terms of the project,” but that, “I do think if there was a bit 
more structure and hierarchy it would have (pauses) I don’t think it would have been a 
different outcome. We might have just moved through things even quicker.”202 
 The other interview subject echoed this sentiment. To this person, the idea of 
experts interacting freely ostensibly allowed them to “just brainstorm and go, okay, how 
can we solve this thing rapidly?’ But in reality the ad hoc interactions created duplication 
of effort and, “The effectiveness of the group was probably difficult because there were 
so many people from so many different jurisdictions with so many ideas. In a perfect 
world that would be great, but in an instant decision-making world it’s difficult.”203 
4. Discussion of the SR 530 Task Force’s Configuration 
The SR 530 Task Force was tasked with determining how to remove the debris 
covering SR 530 as quickly as possible while being respectful of the search for remains 
and personal belongings intermingled with the debris. To accomplish this, a group of 
specialists assembled. These individuals brought expertise and typically worked within 
their respective functional area (i.e., area of expertise); they also worked within the rules, 
policies, and procedures that governed their home agency. At the group’s inception, the 
presence of so many equally skilled professionals working within these established 
parameters implied that they would form as a Professional Bureaucracy. Figure 11 
depicts this configuration. 
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Its task environment, however, placed multiple tensions on the SR 530 Task 
Force; those tensions changed its configuration. The expertise of the Professional 
Bureaucracy allowed it the flexibility to address the interdependent and emerging issues 
it faced.204 Concurrently, there was a pressing need to perform its work quickly. This 
pulled the group toward a Simple Structure. These were the instances in which the 
facilitator ensured that the workgroup’s efforts were coordinated, tightly managed the 
meeting schedule, and even limited the group’s membership in order to expedite its work. 
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Although this person was not empowered per se, this sort of coordination reflects a 
Simple Structure. 
 The centralized decision-making described in the interviews also typifies a Simple 
Structure. Although the smaller groups into which the participants self-selected possessed 
the decentralized authority to obligate their agency’s resources, final decisions came 
down to one agency. Cumulatively, these pulls resulted in a hybrid configuration 
Mintzberg called a Simple Professional Bureaucracy (see Figure 12). 
Figure 12.  SR 530 Task Force’s Configuration during the SR 530 Incident Based on 





Configuration theory not only explains how complexity and significant time 
constraints influenced the group’s configuration and created this hybrid; it also suggests 
ways to mitigate the task environment. For example, weather’s unpredictability is 
uncontrollable, but closer coordination with the other planning efforts (perhaps through 
the use of liaisons) might have brought a greater sense of stability to the group. Further, 
some of the perceived time constraints were artificially created by FEMA’s policies 
governing debris management. A request for (or the provision of) flexibility in those 
policy deadlines, especially in what was already a complex and unstable task 
environment, might have relieved some of the hostility created by the time constraints. 
 Configuration theory also provides insight into the SR 530 Task Force’s structural 
properties. Functionally grouping the experts led to effective results, but there was a 
perceived lack of efficiency. The account of an individual who possessed the authority to 
call other agencies’ representatives to the table, but did not have the ability to obligate 
another agency’s resources,205 conforms to Mintzberg’s description of an integrating 
manager. Increasing efficiency may also have been achieved by formally recognizing the 
authority of the integrating manager. In this case, individuals stepped forward and 
unknowingly filled many of the responsibilities of an integrating manger. Had they been 
officially recognized, they might have been able to exert greater influence and move 
things along more quickly. Integrating managers are not currently found in EOC doctrine 
or training; this is yet another example of how configuration theory could benefit EOCs. 
C. THE HUMAN SERVICES MULTIAGENCY TASK FORCE 
 The mission of the Human Services Multiagency Task Force was to “organize and 
orchestrate” human service and mental health support to the survivors.206 Providing such 
services to clients is the core function of many of the agencies that became part of the 
task force. Some of the local agencies had worked together previously, but, as is often the 
case during large-scale incidents, a number of agencies from outside the area arrived to 
offer their assistance. Nearly all of these agencies work within specified charters or under 
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specified authorities, which usually results in each individual agency having a limited 
scope of service. 
1. Factors that Influenced the Multiagency Task Force’s Task 
Environment 
For some of the agencies, providing their services to the survivors and affected 
communities meant performing their work in an unfamiliar environment. The local 
agencies were performing work that they typically performed, but “relative to other 
human services issues it [the complexity] was quite high,” said one of the respondents.207 
“The human services group … had great experience in their base services, but the whole 
disaster element was new,” said another.208 The third interviewee, who agreed that they 
were performing their work in an unprecedented environment, attributed it to the context 
of the situation. According to that person, 
The main thing [is] that for the most part the different aspects were in and 
of themselves (pauses) each of them was simple enough. The most 
difficult was probably (pauses) the most difficult was dealing with the fact 
that it was a mass fatality,  
which to the same respondent meant dealing with “the most craziest [sic] complex thing 
we have done.”209 
 The diversity of needs was another factor that influenced the task environment. 
Before they could even understand exactly what was needed, the Multiagency Task Force 
had to identify the survivors and their family members, some of whom lived outside of 
the area.210 Once they did, there were a “number of things that needed to happen where 
there were guidelines for what needed to happen and the different areas where these 
things needed to happen [but] you couldn’t use the same solution for all parts of the 
incident.”211 An example of the latter was the reunification of personal belongings, a 
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challenge that entailed “a whole new program that needed to be developed without a 
template to work from.”212 Feeding and sheltering survivors, ensuring availability of 
mental health resources, and developing the means to reunite survivors with their 
personal property comprised just part of the group’s work. Ultimately, the task force’s 
mission was to find ways to try to meet the physical, psychological, and financial needs 
of the people affected by this tragedy. 
 Dozens of organizations joined the effort to address the needs of the survivors. On 
one hand, the availability of so many personnel was an asset. “We were able to have a lot 
of people in and out and … like, we need this body of work done, can you come in and 
do it?” said one.213 On the other hand, the multiple organizations created some confusion. 
They included volunteers and members of non-governmental organizations, state 
emergency management, and federal emergency management that arrived very quickly. 
One interviewee said, “You [were] continually having to incorporate new actors at a very 
fast pace … people were coming in, they are here one day and gone the next.”214 The 
influx of entities introduced agencies that brought in “people from all over the country,” 
remembered one interviewee, who added that these groups had to learn that they were 
“playing in the same sand box.”215 The rapidly changing faces and agencies involved 
concerned one of the participants, who shared that “Any uncertainty [about their ability to 
complete their task] was, ‘How do we get there [get the task completed] in a constantly 
changing environment?’”216  
In addition to these factors, time influenced the task environment, and the 
respondents’ recollections of its effect were powerful and poignant. One recalled,  
There wasn’t a person out there who wasn’t aware that this was a 
catastrophic event in which there was a tremendous loss of life, and for 
those that didn’t lose their lives that there was (pauses). I mean, in the 
immediate survivor community there were people who were profoundly 
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affected and traumatized, and that rippled out. Every minute that we were 
losing with trying to be able to hook in with people was a minute that we 
were losing to help try to reduce the level of trauma for them.217  
The desire to address this, especially within a group of professionals dedicated to 
providing human services, was clearly stated by one respondent. “I think I was here 20 
hours the first day and was down to 16 after that, but (pauses) so the first three days were 
totally crazy.”218 And throughout the course of those long days, things happened quickly. 
“It was all bam, bam, bam … it was all time driven.”219 
2. Structural Properties that Appeared in the Multiagency Task Force 
 The task force was created to coordinate the number of agencies involved; one of 
the interviewees estimated that at times there were 200 people220 who represented dozens 
of agencies. One interviewee said, 
The primary way, I guess, in which they [the various entities] became 
incorporated structurally was through the creation of the multiagency task 
force. FEMA actually helped us set that up where you sort of looked at all 
of the various human services functions and services and organized an 
overarching task force.221  
One agency was now responsible for providing someone whose job was “facilitating the 
meetings … you know, running the agenda, but basically everybody in this whole group 
[was] equal partners.”222 Another described the climate as one in which “Nobody is 
telling us what to do, we are not telling anybody else what to do. It’s more ‘we are 
partners, we are collaborating.’ So it [was] very peer to peer.”223  
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 Many of the members of the task force were “career helping professionals” for 
whom “that kind of process [providing human services] is sort of like breathing.”224 With 
so many needs to address, from the early stages of the task force’s existence, these 
professionals coalesced into groups focused on determining the best way to address the 
needs. One respondent described those groups as autonomous “bubbles,” saying, “I 
would check in with them and if they were staying within their bubble, their problems are 
their problems.”225 Another stated that the groups were “various committees [that] were 
really like workgroups [within the task force].”226 The third considered them “circles and 
spheres of influence.”227 The people within the groups exercised the ability to interact 
freely. There were “lots of telephone calls, you know quick brief meetings [sic], 
conference calls, and things like that.”228 More specifically, if individuals needed to talk, 
they would “pick up the phone and call back and forth and deal with whatever the 
individual thing was at the time.”229 This was not an expectation of the group’s 
leadership; it was just the way they worked through issues. “This was not a chain of 
command kind of situation. If you are working on [an issue], you all go off and go over 
there [and resolve it],” was how one interviewee characterized the situation.230 
 Collectively, the Multiagency Task Force did not rely on pre-established 
processes. It performed its work in a situation in which “We are not going to be able to 
apply a single set of simple rules and make us all functional,” and as a newly formed 
group, “We didn’t have clear processes that everybody understood,” said one of interview 
subjects.231 The group attempted to establish processes in a manner described as “totally 
ad hoc.”232 Meanwhile, the individual agencies had their own policies; this complicated 
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attempts to create a shared process and occasionally created friction. According to one 
interviewee,  
Where it broke down was when we were having to establish the new 
relationships on the fly and they have got their processes and procedures, 
you have got your processes and procedures, and how are you going to 
make those mesh? And when they don’t mesh, then you are doing the call 
around and seeing who you can find that has got the authority to, you 
know, get it together and bull through it.233 
The diverse processes perpetuated because there was no singular authority (“not a 
chain of command kind of situation”), so the agencies maintained their respective 
authorities. Some power was delegated to their representatives, but it was not always 
clear “at what level of the organization is [a] decision being made” and, “You could 
spend an hour talking to somebody and think that you have just worked out how to do X 
and in fact find out that they have no decision making authority whatsoever.”234 When it 
was clear, the delegated decision-making had benefits. “I was given a phenomenal 
amount of leeway … I could make whatever decisions I wanted,” said one of the 
interviewees.235 This allowed the agencies that “have got [sic] the responsibility and the 
authority” to execute what needed to be done.236 It also affected the group’s 
performance. 
3. Perceived Impact on the Multiagency Task Force’s Performance 
 Within the group were agencies that provided the same services. Without a single 
authority or established process to assign clients to specific agencies, duplication 
occurred. Duplicated efforts meant resources were not used as efficiently as they could 
have been. “In terms of efficiency, there is no question there were redundancies and that 
there were overlaps.”237 The Multiagency Task Force was good for “doing the kinds of 
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problem solving stuff,” but the group needed someone to direct “all of these other folks 
coming in and saying we are here to help. Fine, here is how you can do it.”238  
 Asked how that would change the group’s performance, one interviewee said,  
Certainly, first and foremost, the efficiency. Like I say, this (pauses) 
people wound up being effective, but I think that there were a lot of 
resources, time being one of the scarcest and unrecoverable one [of those], 
that were used with trying to get it (pauses) to try to get this to work. If we 
say that someone’s coming, this is where we see that you can fit in. You 
know what? If you don’t want to do this [disaster], great. Go on to the next 
one because you know that there’s a next one. That is actually more 
efficient and ultimately probably even somewhat more effective than have 
them running around and being in the community doing their own 
thing.239  
In the end, this person found that individual professionalism led to effective outcomes. 
“Everybody was going to figure out a way in this wildly inefficient environment for how 
to be effective” and that ultimately the group was “reasonably effective, eventually, 
through a lot of blood, sweat, and tears.”240 
Another participant concurred that duplication led to inefficiency and that some of 
the duplication resulted from agencies that were not part of the task force operating in the 
communities. In this person’s opinion, the task force’s facilitator should have been 
empowered as “an interim filler connector point.” Specifically, this connector should 
have had the authority to mandate agency participation in the task force and to coordinate 
the agencies’ actions without supplanting their respective authorities.241 
4. Discussion of the Multiagency Task Force’s Configuration 
The Multiagency Task Force formed to coordinate assistance that ranged from 
fulfilling basic human needs, such as providing shelter, to addressing very long-term 
issues like disaster-related mental health for the survivors of the SR 530 incident. A wide 
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variety of public, private, and nonprofit agencies assisted in these efforts;242 these 
agencies typically provide a limited scope of service to meet specific needs for their 
clients. When the task force formed, skilled professionals who worked within their 
respective entity’s specific authorities represented their agencies. Without a singular 
authority and anticipating these skilled professionals would continue to deliver their 
services in “silos” that matched their agency’s mission, the task force would be predicted 
to configure as a Professional Bureaucracy (shown in Figure 13). 
Figure 13.  Assumed Configuration of the Human Services Multiagency Task Force 
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 In this situation, the key requirement was for the Multiagency Task Force to 
coordinate the efforts of different programs and agencies in a rapidly changing 
environment. This pulled this Professional Bureaucracy toward adhocratic behavior that 
included a reliance on mutual adjustment and the ability to quickly form small groups 
tailored to each survivor’s needs. Mintzberg noted that professional bureaucracies tend to 
forego new solutions in favor of standard programs243 and that an adhocracy is a 
configuration that “innovates and solves problems directly on behalf of its clients.”244 
 The emergence of an adhocracy’s characteristics acknowledged the nature of the 
challenge of providing a full array of assistance to a diverse population of survivors. The 
agencies never ceded their individual authorities and relied on each individual’s expertise 
within that authority, so the group maintained characteristics of a Professional 
Bureaucracy and an Adhocracy. This is a hybrid Mintzberg called the Professional 
Bureau/Adhocracy; this research deems it a Professional Adhocracy. This configuration, 
depicted in Figure 14, created a structure the participants characterized as “flat” or “very 
flat”245 and one in which “nobody is telling us what to do [and] we are not telling 
anybody else what to do.”246 At the same time, it allowed the group to leverage its 
members’ expertise and experience while enhancing their effectiveness by allowing those 
experts the latitude to respond to the task environment’s complexity and rapid change. 
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Figure 14.  Human Services Multiagency Task Force’s Configuration during the SR 




 The responses indicated that while retaining their authorities improved 
effectiveness, it hampered efficiency. Some of this could be attributed to the sheer size of 
the group, which greatly exceeded the doctrinal definition of span of control247 but was 
generally associated with increased effectiveness. It was clear from the interview 
participants that the lack of defined authority affected efficiency. Unlike the SR 530 Task 
Force, which had a single authority, this group more closely adhered to configuration 
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theory’s definition of a task force (which emphasizes equal participation) than the 
doctrinal definition.248 Without an authority (i.e., a person or agency in charge), the 
group lacked a means to centralize; this precluded its ability to adhere to Mintzberg’s 
assertion about the need to centralize during extreme hostility and further impeded its 
efficiency. Establishing a means to centralize would have expedited decision-making. 
 A better understanding of configuration theory could have identified the effect of 
time pressures and the need to establish a single authority. It could have also identified 
other factors in the task environment that influenced the configuration but could have 
been mitigated. For example, although little could change the perceptions of complexity 
that came from the number of issues the group needed to address, the number of agencies 
involved, and the lack of previous experience, instability could have been addressed. The 
rapid turnover in people and programs, which created instability, could have been 
managed through the commitment of staff availability and agency engagement. Examples 
such as this become clearly recognizable when viewed through the lens of configuration 
theory. 
D. CROSS-CASE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 The analysis of all of the interview subjects’ responses revealed that they shared 
certain perceptions of their task environments, their groups’ structural properties, and the 
groups’ configurations. This section communicates those shared perceptions with an 
embedded discussion based on the literature. Because all of the groups experienced these 
issues, the author considered them more generalizable. 
 In their task environments, the three groups’ experiences demonstrated that: (a) a 
high number of external factors involved generated complexity, (b) a lack of predictable 
and consistent staffing created instability, and (c) although relative, time affected all of 
them greatly. As such, EOC managers may want to plan for, or be prepared to 
specifically address, these factors of the environment during large-scale, no-notice 
incidents. 
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 To address the tasks assigned to them, it would have been difficult for the two 
task forces to reduce the number of agencies; however, the Logistics Section may have 
mitigated the complexity caused by the presence of so many agencies by focusing the 
staff on its “simple, simple task.”249 Focusing on the routine work of processing a 
resource request might have minimized the distraction caused by the number of agencies 
and the overall magnitude of the incident. Meanwhile, all of the groups might have 
reduced their sense of instability by minimizing staff turnover and ensuring consistent 
scheduling. Finally, earlier recognition and implementation of ways to reach decisions 
more quickly (e.g., through centralization) may have reduced the effect of time pressures. 
 The groups shared some commonalities in their organization’s structural 
properties. Every group used liaison devices, some of which did not fit those found in 
current emergency management doctrine. Those included the task force (Mintzberg’s 
description) and integrating managers. The latter appeared in the two task forces, both of 
which far exceeded the span of control recommended by the NIMS document.250 This 
may indicate that multiple liaison devices can overcome span of control issues on large-
scale incidents. Functional grouping, featured by all of the groups, may have also helped 
mitigate their large size. In terms of other coordination mechanisms, all of the groups 
prominently featured the use of mutual adjustment, but the research noted that it was 
cited as a factor that both contributed to effectiveness and one that degraded efficiency. 
In a time-constrained environment, which is what each group described, recognizing this 
trade-off affords the opportunity for EOC managers to make informed decisions 
regarding the comprehensiveness or timeliness of a group’s efforts. 
 The common theme in these groups’ configuration was that one size did not fit 
all. All of them implemented a hybrid that leveraged aspects of more than one of 
Mintzberg’s five basic configurations. This appeared attributable to their need to respond 
to multiple valid forces, a circumstance that Mintzberg found “perfectly logical.”251 
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While little may have seemed logical to the members of these groups responding to the 
unprecedented nature of this incident, the need for their organizations to complete tasks 
in distinct environments that were subject to rapid change was clear. Less logical was the 
pull of some toward behaviors that did not fit the environment, for example, the Logistics 
Section’s adamant advocacy of standardized processes. Mintzberg did state that 
contradictory situational factors beyond an organization’s control could drive them 
toward dysfunctional hybrids. He specifically cited instances where highly trained 
operators (Professional Bureaucracy) working for governmental entities are pushed 
toward Machine Bureaucracy.252 This may explain the responses from the Logistics 
Section’s representatives. 
E. SUMMARY 
 This chapter presented the results of the analysis of nine interviews and 
discussions based on the reviewed literature. The results revealed the factors that affected 
the groups’ task environments, the structural properties that appeared in the groups, and 
participants’ perceptions of the impact on their respective group’s performance. The 
discussions focused on the configuration of each group and offered opportunities, 
grounded in configuration theory, to improve the performance of each group. 
 At both the workgroup level and across the teams, an understanding of 
configuration theory might have led to an earlier recognition of the task environment and 
provided the EOC’s management with options better suited for the conditions. The next 
chapter provides comprehensive recommendations for emergency management doctrine 
and training, suggestions for future research, and the conclusion to this study. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 The results of the analyses provide some validation of configuration theory’s 
utility within the context of an EOC. At its outset, this research hypothesized that an 
understanding of configuration theory might help emergency managers organize the staff 
in an EOC in a manner that enhances the staff’s performance. To explore that hypothesis, 
the author conducted semi-structured interviews with members of three distinct 
workgroups that formed during the SCEOC’s response to a large scale, no-notice 
incident. 
 The initial analysis of the qualitative data provided by those interviews resulted in 
the identification of factors that shaped each workgroup’s respective task environment 
and the features (i.e., structural properties) of their organizations; it also provided the 
basis for a discussion of their configurations. A second analysis extrapolated themes 
shared by all three of the workgroups. These analyses demonstrated examples where an 
understanding of configuration theory might well have allowed EOC managers to 
proactively configure, or make more responsive adjustments to the configuration of, the 
organization, and that these changes would have improved the organization’s 
effectiveness and/or efficiency. The following sections summarize the findings, discuss 
the implications and recommendations related to the findings, and offer some suggestions 
for future research. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 Using the lens of configuration theory, this research examined three workgroups 
that formed during the SCEOC’s response to the SR 530 flooding and mudslides incident. 
The author analyzed nine participants’ perspectives to determine the factors that shaped 
each group’s task environment and the structural properties that the group adopted, or 
those that emerged. The following is a synopsis of the findings from the SCEOC 
Logistics Section, the SR 530 Task Force, and the Human Services Multiagency Task 
Force. 
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 The SCEOC Logistics Section supported the resource needs of the incident’s 
responders. It preexisted the SR 530 incident; in previous exercises and incidents it 
performed routine work using a standardized work process, but found that process 
overwhelmed by this situation. In response to the loss of a standardized process and 
needing to perform work in a moderately complex, dynamic, and very time critical 
environment, the workgroup adopted specific structural properties. First, in response to 
the time criticality, the section’s leaders took a more prominent role in coordinating the 
workgroup’s efforts. Second, to address the complexity, the members of the group used 
adhocratic behavior (e.g., mutual adjustment) to coordinate with each other. These 
remained the prevalent means of performing their work until a standardized work process 
was reestablished and, with it, a routine work environment. The interview participants 
cited a lack of standardized work process and the sheer complexity of the incident as 
detriments to the group’s performance, but agreed that the group’s ability to interact 
informally helped them be effective. They also clearly communicated the value of the 
section chief’s direction in helping the group perform its task efficiently in the absence of 
a standard process. 
 The SR 530 Task Force formed after the incident; its task was to clear the debris 
from SR 530 so the road could be reopened. Composed of subject-matter experts in their 
respective disciplines, this workgroup was asked to perform complex work under 
significant time constraints and for which there was no previous knowledge. The 
expertise of the members helped them identify solutions to the problems posed by this 
novel situation; the workgroup’s facilitator became instrumental in coordinating the 
timely efforts of the disparate disciplines. As a group, the participants felt that they 
performed their task very effectively, but that the lack of an emphatic decision-making 
authority hindered their efficiency. 
 The third group was the Human Services Multiagency Task Force. Like the SR 
530 Task Force, this workgroup formed after the incident. Its task was to support the 
survivors of the tragedy. Many, many organizations offered assistance, and this group’s 
size approached 200 participants. The task force was established to provide a mechanism 
to coordinate efforts and provide comprehensive services that addressed an incredibly 
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wide spectrum of need (complex) as quickly as possible (time critical) in an evolving 
environment (dynamic). The representatives of the agencies were experts in their 
respective areas of service and committed to helping people; the lack of a singular 
authority to direct them led to duplicated efforts. Such duplication meant that they 
effectively completed their work, but lacked efficiency in doing so. 
 All of the groups interacted with a large number of external factors and 
stakeholders, which generated complexity. They also experienced a lack of consistent 
staffing, and that resulted in instability. Time criticality was also a recurring, albeit 
relative, theme. In these task environments, liaison devices and the ability to coordinate 
informally among peers (i.e., mutual adjustment) were cited as particularly useful, 
helping to mitigate the incident’s complexity by facilitating coordination externally and 
internally, respectively. At least one of the liaison devices implemented, the integrating 
manager, is not currently found in EOC doctrine. The findings also indicated that these 
groups relied on very flexible structures (i.e., hybrid configurations), which incorporated 
aspects of multiple configurations. For the Logistics Section and the SR 530 Task Force, 
this was particularly important as these groups faced the simultaneous needs to make 
decisions in a time-constrained environment (i.e., increase their efficiency) and to 
problem solve in complex environments (i.e., increase their effectiveness). For the 
Human Services Multiagency Task Force, the hybrid configuration allowed it to leverage 
the representatives’ expertise to provide holistic support to the survivors while 
maintaining agency integrity. 
B. OVERARCHING IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This research suggests the need to consider fundamental changes to EOC doctrine 
and training. In Chapter I, the author contended that current EOC doctrine and training 
are incomplete because they are narrowly focused, primarily relying on the on-scene ICS 
as the basis for organizing an EOC. The analysis demonstrated the benefits of 
understanding how and why to configure an organization, which requires comprehension 
of the relationship between the task environment and the configuration. It provided 
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examples of how specific structural properties enhance or hinder a group’s performance. 
All of this is found within configuration theory’s concepts and principles. 
 Configuration theory does not advocate a best structure; it contends that the 
structure must fit the task environment. In the changing environment that is disaster 
response, EOC staff should expect to have to adapt. Knowing the parameters of 
configuration theory can guide the efforts of leaders in an EOC to implement adaptive 
organization design; therefore, this research recommends that EOC doctrine and training 
expand to include configuration theory. This expansion should include definitions of the 
factors that influence the task environment and the structural properties of organizations. 
Because an EOC’s focus is primarily on coordination, particular attention should be paid 
to configuration theory’s coordinating mechanisms. Doctrine and training should also 
highlight the different ways to configure an organization, including hybrid 
configurations. It is further recommended that appropriate learning objectives for 
emergency management training and education be developed to include an appropriate 
level of understanding of configuration theory. 
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Despite the critical role EOCs play during disasters, there is a dearth of qualitative 
or quantitative research on their performance; therefore, they deserve to be the subject of 
future studies. This research examined multiple teams within a single case study to begin 
to identify ways to improve the performance of an EOC by using configuration theory. 
The nature of the case study’s incident is what Yin classified an extreme case,253 and it 
offers many unique opportunities for future research. 
 For example, subsequent research on how to improve EOC performance could 
focus on the individuals who staffed the SCEOC. Mintzberg articulated the importance of 
designing individual positions and specifically mentioned the effects of job 
specialization, behavior formalization, and training/indoctrination.254 While this research 
focused on the unit, studying the individuals would provide insight into how to better 
                                                 
253 Yin, Case Study Research, 47. 
254 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 25–44. 
 81 
coordinate the efforts of the individual staff members. Conversely, a study could also be 
conducted to assess the EOC comprehensively (i.e., assess the overarching organization). 
Ultimately, the individuals and disparate sections have an inherently limited effect on the 
success of the community’s response efforts. The entire EOC, however, delivers 
significantly greater impact. A starting point for this analysis could be Mintzberg’s 
assertion that a hybrid exists that uses different configurations in the various parts of the 
organization.255 
 Of course, the lack of previous research also means that any comparative studies 
would further the understanding of how to improve EOC performance. Those could be 
analyses of individual positions, sections, or EOCs in toto operating in similar or 
different task environments. Another opportunity is an examination of the competing 
requirements posed by complexity (which in this case study led to decentralized problem 
solving) and time criticality (which in this case study pulled the groups toward 
centralized decision-making). From the author’s perspective, there is simply a need to 
add to a knowledge base that empirically improves EOC performance. 
D. CLOSING COMMENTS 
 The staff in an EOC must perform well. When an EOC is activated, a community 
is usually facing a disaster; its EOC plays a critical role in the response. This was true 
during the response to the SR 530 Flooding and Mudslides, and the goal of this research 
was to identify ways that may improve the EOC staff’s performance. Configuration 
theory offers a way. 
 Configuration theory states that organizations that configure themselves based 
upon their task environment are more likely to perform well. This thesis examines if 
adhering to this premise might benefit an EOC’s staff. The author’s analysis of interviews 
of members of three workgroups revealed aspects of each group’s configuration that 
worked well in their respective task environments and others that did not. It also provided 
examples of instances where the application of configuration theory might have improved 
effectiveness and efficiency in the SCEOC. 
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 There is no way to go back in time to verify such assertions. Moving forward, the 
hope is that the findings of this research will inform EOC doctrine and training and 
inspire future studies that will cumulatively improve EOCs’ performance across the 
nation. The increasing frequency of disasters and the importance of local EOCs reinforce 
the need to improve. This thesis offers important insights from one tragedy; the 
emergency management discipline should endeavor to build upon them. 
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APPENDIX. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
Date of Interview: _______________ 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to talk with me. By agreeing to be interviewed, you indicate 
that you understand the information gathered may be part of this research. The responses 
will be used in a way that respects and ensures your privacy, and all individual 
contributions will remain confidential. The interview will take approximately one hour to 
complete. 
 
This study is voluntary and you have the right not to answer any question. 
 
Thank you in advance for your participation. 
 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
The topic of this research is to determine the effectiveness of various organizational 
designs on emergency operations center (EOC) activities. The purpose of this interview is 
to discover perceptions and reflections about organizational factors that impacted groups’ 
performance during the response to the SR 530 slide incident, which occurred in 
Snohomish County, Washington, in March 2014. It is believed that this research may 





Work group: _________________________________ 
 
1. Select one of the below to describe your group’s level of disaster-related training. 
a. The group had no disaster-related training. 
b. The group had minimal disaster-related training. 
c. The group had moderate disaster-related training. 
d. The group had significant disaster-related training. 
 
2. Select one of the below to describe your group’s disaster-related experience. 
a. The group had no previous disaster experience. 
b. The group had minimal disaster experience. 
c. The group had moderate disaster experience. 


















1. Describe the amount of certainty or uncertainty you perceive your group felt 
about completing its task. 




Place an X on the line below to show how time criticality affected your group. 
 
 





1. Describe how time affected the group’s decision-making. 




Place an X on the line below to describe your group’s processes. 
 
 





1. Describe a specific example of a problem your group had to solve a problem and 
how that was addressed. 
 85 


















1. Describe your group’s structure and why you placed the X where you did. 
2. Describe the effect of the structure on the speed of your group’s processes. 
3. Describe the effect of the structure on the effectiveness of your group’s processes. 




1. How was coordination accomplished? 
2. How was authority delegated for group members to coordinate? 
3. If faced with a problem of similar complexity, describe how you would structure 
your group. 
4. Did the structure offer adequate flexibility to meet changing needs or 








1. How did the group’s experience affect the structure and its ability to complete its 
task? 
2. Did other factors, such as the individual participant’s professionalism, affect 
either the structure or the processes? If so, how? 
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